Not only did Wittgenstein himself regard his work on mathematics as his most important contribution to philosophy; it is also in this work that it is most apparent how radically his philosophical perspective differes from that of the professional philosophy of the twentieth century. It is here that we can see most clearly the truth of his conviction that he was working against the stream of modern civilization. For the target at which his remarks are aimed is not a particular view of mathematics that has been held by this or that philosopher; it is, rather, a conception of the subject that is held almost universally among mathematicians, and that has, moreover, been dominant throughout our entire culture for more than a century - the view, that is, that sees mathematics as a science (...)
Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is not a contribution to the debate on the foundations of the subject that was fought during the first half of this century by the opposing camps of logicists (led by Frege and Russel), formalists (led by Hilbert) and institutionists (led by Brouwer and Weyl). It is, instead, an attempt to undermine the whole basis of this debate - to undermine the idea that mathematics needs foundations. All the branches of mathematics that were inspired by this search for 'foundations' - Set Theory, Proof Theory, Quantificational Logic, Recursive Function Theory, etc. - he regarded as based on a philosophical confusion.

(Пасажът отново е от посочената в предишния ми постинг книга)