Британска дипломация
9 отговора
462 прегледа
Re: Британска дипломация
"Тя (Сърбия) трябва да преотстъпи и ако е необходимо да бъде накарана (б.п.подразбира се със сила) да предаде неоспоримата зона в Македония на българите, на която принадлежи по раса, история и договор" (" she (Serbia) should cede, and if necessary be made to surrender, the uncontested zone in Macedonia to the Bulgarians, to whom it belonged by race, by history, by treaty.")
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в отговор на бaш бyrapaш
#3
Re: Британска дипломация
Горе долу такива неща си спомням и аз. И още нещо си спомням - мисля че преди това той казва "ние трябваше да привлечем България на наша страна... спортата зона й принадлежи по раса, народ..." - май по повод на Първата световна война.
Добре е ако някой има целият текст на мемоарите, които засягат България да го постне тука.
Добре е ако някой има целият текст на мемоарите, които засягат България да го постне тука.
в отговор на бaш бyrapaш
#6
баш бугараш уще ли мастурбираш...
баш бугараш уще ли мастурбираш...
Каква врска има що Черчил напишал, кога британските тайни служби во разговор со Македонците дознале дека Македонците себеси по националност се изяснуваат како Македонци.
Каква врска има що Черчил напишал, кога британските тайни служби во разговор со Македонците дознале дека Македонците себеси по националност се изяснуваат како Македонци.
в отговор на antikomunist
#8
Re: това им било работата
да пазят Тайна. Дедо Крум Донски е бил дискретен човек...
Re: баш бугараш уще ли мастурбираш...
Аз съм добре, битуше, благодаря, че попита.
И Чърчил е добре....
I was strongly of opinion during the month of July that we ought not to stake the whole Balkan policy solely on the result of a battle in Gallipoli, but that, while doing everything in our power to secure a victory there, we should also strive to win Bulgaria. This could be done only by territorial concessions, forced upon Greece and Serbia, combined with the granting of loans and the expectation of success in the Dardanelles. The imminent peril in which Serbia stood, and the restricted conditions under which the Allies could afford her protection, made it indispensable that she should cede, and if necessary be made to surrender, the uncontested zone in Macedonia' to the Bulgarians, to whom it belonged by race, by history, by treaty, and - until it was taken from them in the second Balkan War - by conquest. Serbia, even when at the last gasp during the first Austrian attack upon her in 1914, had found it necessary to keep large numbers of troops in the Bulgarian districts of Macedonia to hold down the native population. Right and reason, the claims of justice, and the most imperious calls of necessity, alike counselled the Serbians to surrender at least the uncontested zone. To the ordinary exhortations of diplomacy were added special appeals by the Sovereigns and the Rulers of the allied countries. The Prince Regent of Serbia was besought by the Tsar, by the President of the French Republic, and by King George V, to make a concession right in itself, necessary in the common cause, vital to the safety of Serbia. But to all these appeals the Serbian Government and Parliament proved obdurate. The allied diplomacy, moving ponderously forward - every telegram and measure having to be agreed to by all the other parties to the alliance - had just reached the point of refusing any further supplies of stores or money to Serbia unless she complied with their insistent demand, when the final invasion began.
The same sort of thing happened about Kavalla. M. Venizelos, with his almost unerring judgment of great issues, was prepared to imperil his whole per¬sonal popularity in Greece and place himself at a deadly disadvantage in his controversies with the King by intimating his readiness to acquiesce in the ces¬sion to Bulgaria of Kavalla in certain circumstances. Had the Allies been able to secure for Bulgaria the immediate cession of the uncontested zone in Macedonia and the port of Kavalla, it seems very probable that they might have been induced during the month of July to come to our aid and to march on Adrianople.
It seems certain that, even if this full result had not been obtained, the tangible cession of this territory to Bulgaria at the instance of the Allies would have made it impossible for King Ferdinand to carry his country into the hostile camp. Monsieur Radoslavov5 gave in brutally frank language a perfect¬ly truthful account of the Bulgarian position in these months. No effective measures were, however, taken, and all was left to the hazard of the battle on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918,repr. London, 1932, pp. 575-577.
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И Чърчил е добре....
I was strongly of opinion during the month of July that we ought not to stake the whole Balkan policy solely on the result of a battle in Gallipoli, but that, while doing everything in our power to secure a victory there, we should also strive to win Bulgaria. This could be done only by territorial concessions, forced upon Greece and Serbia, combined with the granting of loans and the expectation of success in the Dardanelles. The imminent peril in which Serbia stood, and the restricted conditions under which the Allies could afford her protection, made it indispensable that she should cede, and if necessary be made to surrender, the uncontested zone in Macedonia' to the Bulgarians, to whom it belonged by race, by history, by treaty, and - until it was taken from them in the second Balkan War - by conquest. Serbia, even when at the last gasp during the first Austrian attack upon her in 1914, had found it necessary to keep large numbers of troops in the Bulgarian districts of Macedonia to hold down the native population. Right and reason, the claims of justice, and the most imperious calls of necessity, alike counselled the Serbians to surrender at least the uncontested zone. To the ordinary exhortations of diplomacy were added special appeals by the Sovereigns and the Rulers of the allied countries. The Prince Regent of Serbia was besought by the Tsar, by the President of the French Republic, and by King George V, to make a concession right in itself, necessary in the common cause, vital to the safety of Serbia. But to all these appeals the Serbian Government and Parliament proved obdurate. The allied diplomacy, moving ponderously forward - every telegram and measure having to be agreed to by all the other parties to the alliance - had just reached the point of refusing any further supplies of stores or money to Serbia unless she complied with their insistent demand, when the final invasion began.
The same sort of thing happened about Kavalla. M. Venizelos, with his almost unerring judgment of great issues, was prepared to imperil his whole per¬sonal popularity in Greece and place himself at a deadly disadvantage in his controversies with the King by intimating his readiness to acquiesce in the ces¬sion to Bulgaria of Kavalla in certain circumstances. Had the Allies been able to secure for Bulgaria the immediate cession of the uncontested zone in Macedonia and the port of Kavalla, it seems very probable that they might have been induced during the month of July to come to our aid and to march on Adrianople.
It seems certain that, even if this full result had not been obtained, the tangible cession of this territory to Bulgaria at the instance of the Allies would have made it impossible for King Ferdinand to carry his country into the hostile camp. Monsieur Radoslavov5 gave in brutally frank language a perfect¬ly truthful account of the Bulgarian position in these months. No effective measures were, however, taken, and all was left to the hazard of the battle on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918,repr. London, 1932, pp. 575-577.
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