Yugoslavia Agrees…Now What? 1800 GMT, 990603 The Serbs have accepted the G-8 peace agreement. NATO has responded "coolly" as CNN is saying. The coolness is rooted in a core paradox in this agreement. The active implementation of the agreement requires that the Serbs withdraw from Kosovo. The Serbs have agreed to do this. However, the actual physical withdrawal requires that NATO do something first. Actually, it has to do two things and each of those actions are seen by NATO as the key motivators that compelled Serbia to accept the agreement. NATO has to do something about the bombing and something about the KLA. The Serbs have about 40,000 troops in Kosovo. It will take time, perhaps several weeks, to transport all of those troops out of the province. Transportation must be arranged, dispersed troops must be moved to concentration points, transports must roll. This can’t take place under bombing. If NATO is hitting everything that rolls down a Kosovo road and bombing every concentration of Serb troops, the withdrawal is impossible. It is conceivable that a partial bombing halt would solve the problem, but that would require a degree of collaboration with the Serbs, including designating bombing free roads, marshalling areas, etc. It requires a level of mutual collaboration that is difficult to envision. Thus, the implementation of the withdrawal agreement requires that NATO do something first: stop the bombing. Second, there is the question of the KLA along the Albanian frontier. According to NATO, the KLA has been conducting military operations that have been uncoordinated with NATO. While we doubt the claim of uncoordination greatly, NATO has itself created an official situation in which a military force under no one’s control is waging operations in Kosovo. The G-8 agreements allow for autonomy but not for the central Albanian demand, independence. The KLA has seen its political position within Kosovo enhanced dramatically over the past sixty days. It neither wants to be reined in nor is it in favor of the peace agreement. The Serbian position is that they are currently locked in combat with the KLA and that a withdrawal from the border regions is impossible without a cease-fire and withdrawal by the KLA. Only NATO can control the KLA. Thus, there is a built-in booby trap in the Serb acceptance of the G-8 agreements, and it is a booby trap built into NATO’s strategy. NATO is demanding "deeds not words" from the Serbs. The deeds they are demanding involve withdrawal. Putting those words into deeds require prior actions by NATO: a bombing halt or modification and clamping down on the KLA. From NATO’s point of view, the bombing and the KLA are the prime pressure points NATO has on Milosevic. Releasing the pressure points prior to active compliance risks a Serb betrayal. Refusing to release the pressure points makes implementation difficult if not impossible. It is much more difficult to implement an armistice than a surrender. In a surrender, the enemy is rendered powerless to resist. In an armistice, the enemy retains the power to resist but has agreed to concessions because of the war. The gap between agreement and implementation frequently requires the stronger power to make the first concession and shifts, simply because of practical considerations. When the armistice involves a massive defeat of the enemy, making those concessions are not particularly difficult or painful. The defeated can be motivated to comply. The difficulty in this case is that NATO’s position as victor is not as clear cut as it would like. It certainly has the upper hand, in the sense that it is bombing Serbia and Serbia is doing NATO little damage. However, the outcome is not so clear cut that NATO has strong confidence that the Serbs would not dare use the implementation period to restructure the reality on the ground. Particularly with the Russians in the peacekeeping force, there will be opportunities. Thus, NATO is hesitant to stop the war. NATO must now make a decision. It can continue the war in order to further weaken the Serbs. In that case, the goal of the war shifts from the narrow goal of Kosovo to the broader goal of rendering the Serbs less able to resist. That redefinition of the war has massive political consequences within NATO. Alternatively, it can accept the Serb concession and begin the process of implementing the agreement. The decisions are now NATO’s. The response is actually obvious. Milosevic has accepted NATO terms. NATO must take the steps necessary to permit Milosevic to implement those terms. The problem is not only that NATO doesn’t trust Milosevic. The problem is that NATO doesn’t trust its own victory. It is also that the United States and United Kingdom do not trust their own allies to resume the war if the Serbs reneg. That last is the real key. In Vietnam, the United States made an agreement that required not only North Vietnamese compliance, but also a credible threat of the resumption of war if North Vietnam didn’t comply. The threat of war ceased to be credible and North Vietnamese compliance was lost. It is not clear to NATO that the resumption of war is a credible threat and therefore not clear that Belgrade will comply in the long run. That is why a bombing halt and reining in the KLA are causing such problems. It is also why NATO seems oddly paralyzed by Milosevic’s capitulation.