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Интересно изявление. Съжалявам, че нямам време да го преведа на български.
Излиза, че американците са водели (макар формално да не са командвали) терористите в Авганистан. Англосаксонците си обичат мохамеданите, и това си е! Което обяснява тоталния шок в управляващите среди на САЩ от 11 СЕП 2001. Трудно е да се намери сблъсък между християни и мохамедани, в който англо-саксонците да НЕ са били на мохамеданска страна! От българската национална памет, справка английските офицери, навлекли турски униформи и водили турски войски в България през Освободителната Война. Без да навлизаме в анти-българските про-мохамедански изяви през късните 1980-ти.
В сравнение с изявленията на други негови колеги, джентълменът Кидд проявява изумителна липса на анти-руска омраза. Заради което - моите уважения! И също заради което си правя труда да поместя следващото тук. (Примерно, брътвежите на английските англо-саксонци за опита им по Авганистан - с такава омразна низост не бих зацапал даже тоалетна хартия!)
Ето и изявленията на джентълмен Кидд:
Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2001 11:59 PM
Dear USMA Classmates:
Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first
there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the
Tajik border and in this capacity have traveled all along the border
region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy
Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This
program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000
persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat
ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as decreed by the Taliban, against
the evil of landmines, and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all
those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs"
-even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the most
respected relief effort in the country and because of this I had the
opportunity to travel extensively, without too much interference or
restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the
Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.
I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but
quite frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and
have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would
like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.
First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and
character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share
some comments about our "enemy."
Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated
beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people
live day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery
and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even
less.
The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace.
They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to
information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by
the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing that is except for their
pride.
Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often
referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs", and a fanatical group of
religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The
non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in
the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created
with assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was
referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to
bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil
war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time this military support along
with financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt
significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector-
general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect senior Talib
leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which
were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he
learn
to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2
years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part
of the local Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban
regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local
humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions
have become even harsher.
It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban.
Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting
recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on
non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL
and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on their way to
sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines
have experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment.
During the Afghan war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the
martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time
and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would
all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle
against the Soviets.
Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never
conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan
battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military
skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no
matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing from
the prone is considered distasteful (but still done). Traditionally,
the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing
allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards and
so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And
while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units
in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there.
All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal
lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor"
and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between
families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual
slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen
fighting the Russians.
It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of
Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come
out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot
different from our fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of
Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another
group-supposedly on the same side, attacked the first group and stole
the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because
having them was a matter of prestige.
Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed
when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned
tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault
group in order to seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity
of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all involved.
As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not
THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less
so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered?
It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history the
only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the
Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this the
Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is
the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill
most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite
military units. The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan,
the terrain, the weather and the harshness are all weapons that our
enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you
military planner types and armchair generals--around November 1st most
road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by the
Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic at
best).
Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not
think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the
absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was
that we were cowards, who would not risk one life in face to face
combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent,
that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
perception that the US does not have any "will" and that we are
morally and spiritually corrupt.
Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the
extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to
fight coordinated battles and their lack of external support. More
importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down
trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up
and down mountain valleys.
I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and
well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to
second guess current plans or start an academic debate I would share the
following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I
would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy
off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this
cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership making
it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing
discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military
assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine
its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.
Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and
assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our
goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice
between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel."
Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country
not
under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again
to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace.
Sixth, I would consider very carefully putting any female service
members
into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class but within
that
culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and
we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No
Afghan will work with a man who fights with women. I would hold off
from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level of
covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to
force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing.
I expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can
pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do
"pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that we do so on the ground,
"man to man."
While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is
essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can
and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned
above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses
after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies
regarding American resolve and nothing, but nothing will communicate
this except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in
1989 the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to
rebuild the country.
While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to
share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not
abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless
there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local
prisoner exchange.
During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade"
in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take
home with them.
This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where
similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for
those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same
way.
Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US
prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only
to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us
to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations and
to turn this into the world wide religious war that they desperately
want. This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For
further collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling).
This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and
somewhat conversely of compassion and of character. Towards our
enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of
our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our
enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during
war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there
are many, but for shrewd military logic.
For anyone who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your
patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more
concise manner.
Thanks, Richard Kidd (USMA '86)
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