----------------------------------------------------------------- The Sleeper Has Awakened: The Truth about Tito, Dimitrov and the New Macedonia Before a people can know who they are, they must first know who they were. This question, which can he answered by any Macedonian by mere reflection on parentage, is the continuing focus of a 45-year-old propaganda campaign of falsification and misinformation aimed directly at the obliteration of the history of the people of Macedonia and its replacement by a sanitized Yugoslav version. As an example, I call attention to the contents of the Macedonian Cultural magazine, Iskra, published in Adelaide, Australia [1]. The editorial draws attention to an article entitled New Macedonia. It is based, we are told, on Stoyan Christowe's "inspiring speech" delivered in 1945. Within the text of the story, an attempt is made to suitably motivate the reader by statements such as "...The new Macedonians must think of themselves as Yugoslavs first and as Macedonians afterward..." and it just gets better "...Tito is the father of Yugoslavia. Tito is Macedonia's godfather..". Based on available objective evidence, nothing could be further from the truth. Yet such matter continues to be published. Compare the ideology of the modern Iskra to that of the first Macedonian newspaper, Makedonska Iskra, published in Australia from 1946-1957. In one particular front page story the headline read [2] "...TITO TRAITORS, ENEMIES OF SLAV-MACEDONIANS..." It thus appears that time has allowed a "new Tito" to be recycled from his original components. A brief but accurate resume of the careers of Tito, and his Bulgarian companion Georgi Dimitrov, during the 1940s, is here provided as a counterbalance. Josip Broz Tito joined the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) in 1923. After some early set-backs, including a lengthy prison term (1928-34), he was appointed, in 1936, as the organizational secretary of the YCP Politburo. In the following year, 1937, Stalin ordered the liquidation of several hundred Yugoslav Communists living in Moscow. Tito, however, survived the purge of "undesirables." [3]. How he achieved this is open to speculation. The most credible account is that Tito was in fact Stalin's informant against the YCP. Not only did he wish to ingratiate himself further with Stalin, whom he adored, he also removed those who stood between him and final control of the YCP[4]. Not unexpectedly, in late 1937 the Comintern appointed Tito as Secretary General of the YCP. Georgi Dimitrov at that time was Secretary General of the Comintern. The Tito-Dimitrov clique had been established. In future years, Dimitrov, first through his role on the Comintern, then later as Prime Minister of Bulgaria, would support Tito's policies even when their consequences were detrimental, not only to the interests of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but also to the Bulgarian nation. Tito and the YCP had minimal support among the local population. Tito was so intent on accommodating Stalin's policies that he steadfastly refused to resist or disrupt the German invasion of Yugoslavia while the non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany was operative. Even when the call to arms came, he extolled the defense of Russia and its Communist ideals rather than Yugoslavia itself. Furthermore, as Beloff notes in her book, Tito's Flawed Legacy [5] "But Tito was fighting for a communist Yugoslavia and during most of the fighting the principal enemies were not the Axis troops but his own compatriots.." In November 1942, fearing that an allied invasion would rally the people to support Mihailovich, Tito offered the German command an arrangement to serve their mutual interests [6]: 1.All prisoners would be exchanged 2.A truce would be entered into to allow the Partisans to fight the Chetniks 3.The Partisans would oppose any Anglo- American landing on the Adriatic coast. The Germans refused the offer. In an ensuing operation, they destroyed the majority of the Partisan force, which in expectation that an agreement was imminent, became exceptionally complacent. This, therefore, is the ultimate hypocrisy of Tito. The fact that he could urge the general populous to fight to the death against fascism, while simultaneously attempting to make a pact with that same enemy, is the clearest example of this person's true character and tainted patriotic spirit. Tito also was having major problems with the Macedonian Communist Party (MCP). Their leader, Shatorov, refused to have anything to do with the YCP. Satorov preferred to deal with the Bulgarian Communist Party. Furthermore, Satorov supported an autonomous Macedonia[7]. In response, Kolishevski, a Macedonian lackey of the YCP, was dispatched to reorganize the MCP. Unfortunately for Kolishevski, devotion to Tito and the YCP were not quite the correct credentials to inspire the MCP membership. In late 1941, he found himself languishing in a Bulgarian prison for the rest of the war. It was not until 1943 that Tito had managed to infiltrate and corrupt the MCP to the ideals of the YCP. He accomplished this mainly by the elimination of "so-called" misguided leaders and their followers. In all his efforts to bring the BCP and MCP into line, he was well supported by the Comintern. Perhaps the most farcical issue of the war was the YCP's contention, at the 1943 conference, that the people of Yugoslavia, by their very armed resistance against fascism, had unambiguously accepted the establishment of a Yugoslav nation. The issue of self-determination promoted in the 1942 conference had now vanished. The question of the YCP and self-determination is succinctly presented by W. Connor [8] in his book, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy There Conner wrote: "the Communist party had the power to determine when and how self-determination had been exercised. There was simply no need to hold a plebiscite or otherwise try to determine public opinion on the issue. A proper exercise of right was whatever the party said it was..." Connor's thorough and lucid discussion of the "National Question" with respect to overall communist strategy is highly recommended. Tito's final split with Stalin may be directly attributed to an egotistic perception of his role to direct global communist revolution. This split came at a time when Stalin was desperately attempting to consolidate the communist position. He did not want to provoke the militarily superior allied forces. Stalin also had discussed and summarily agreed with Churchill on certain "spheres of influence" with respect to European territory. The following passage from McCagg's book [9], Stalin Embattled 1943-1948, is most pertinent to highlight the true basis of the confrontation between Stalin and Tito: "...Stalin's provocation of Tito in October stemmed from heightened fear of the West; exasperation that a 'peanut.' such as the Yugoslav leader should endanger the interests of the Soviet Union.." On June 28, 1948, the Cominform labeled Tito a person of "counter-revolutionary" inclination and expelled the YCP from their organization. The form of socialism subsequently established in Yugoslavia was appropriately termed "Titoism." Today we may clearly witness the pathetic results of its long-term application. Dimitrov, as leader of the BCP, first came to prominence in Bulgaria during the abortive September, 1923, uprising against the Tsanov government. It should be noted that the Communist leaders Dimitrov, Kolarov and Genov situated their headquarters quite close to the Yugoslav border, a facile escape route in event of failure. By September 28th the revolution was over and the Communist leaders were long gone. Dimitrov would not be seen again on Bulgaria soil until 1945. In early 1924, however, Dimitrov and other leaders of the BCP made a final desperate attempt to foment revolution in Bulgaria through the Agrarian Union. The BCP had little, if any, popular support and badly needed an ally. Dimitrov met the exiled Agrarian, Kosta Todorov, in Vienna and proposed that the two parties work together to overthrow the Tsanov government [10]. The Agrarian leaders, however, quickly perceived that the BCP had little to offer. It was in fact attempting to use the Agrarian union's large following. Consequently the Agrarians only offered the Communists the right to freely participate in elections once a provisional Agrarian government had been established. The BCP dismissed this submission and all negotiations were terminated. Reconciled to his exiled fate, Dimitrov, both through the BCP and his position on the Cominterm, worked tirelessly to undermine and weaken all attempts of IMRO to succeed in its goal of an autonomous Macedonia. On the occasion of the 4th congress of the Macedonian National Union (USA), an organization established to oppose the MPO, Dimitrov sent from Moscow a letter dated May 13, 1934. While the letter was hostile to IMRO, Dimitrov used it to offer his own solution to the "Macedonian" problem [11]. That solution linked the salvation of Macedonia to the acceptance of Communism. Dimitrov was, therefore, as early as 1934, preparing and initiating a continuous chain of events which would ultimately attempt to justify and rationalize the denationalization of the Macedonian Bulgarian people. Although he consistently and vociferously characterized IMRO as a terrorist organization, working directly against the interests of the people of Macedonia, it was, in fact, the BCP which perpetrated terrorist acts such as the April 16, 1925, bombing of the Sveta Nedelya Cathedral. Dimitrov vehemently denied this accusation at his infamous 1933 Leipzig trial. However, he admitted to it quite freely in 1948, when as Prime Minister of Bulgaria, he felt beyond reproach [12] In that same letter to the MNU, he falsely emphasized the cathedral bombing as a prime example of IMRO's cruel and utter disregard for human life. By 1944, Dimitrov faced a number of serious factional issues within the BCP. Traycho Kostov, who ran the party within Bulgaria in Dimitrov's continuing absence, and a large number of BCP members, were opposed to Dimitrov's leadership [13]. By 1949, Kostov had been tried, sentenced and executed as a fascist agent and for committing numerous other imaginary crimes against the state. When Dimitrov finally returned to Bulgaria in November 1945, he quickly liquidated all his adversaries, showing little distinction between Communists and non-Communists. He ensured that he would have absolute control of the BCP for his ambitious social reforms which loomed ahead. In July 1947, Tito and Dimitrov met, at the Bled conference, to discuss the concept of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation and in particular the secession of Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia. There are also suggestions that the Greek Communist Party participated at the Bled meeting. The popular view, although exact details of the Bled conference have never been released, is that in a frenzied lust for power the Communist leaders decreed that the following events should occur [14]: 1.Yugoslavia was to receive Aegean as well as Pirin Macedonia 2.Bulgaria would receive West Thrace as compensation for the loss of the Pirin region 3.The Greek communists would receive unlimited backing from both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in return for their territorial concessions. Tito and Dimitrov's egocentric ambitions are poignantly stated by Crampton [15]: "...for of what importance were state boundaries in the bright new dawn of proletarian internationalism.." Dimitrov was able to convince the upper echelon of the BCP of the necessity for the above program in the context of a South Slav federation to ensure strong Yugoslav support for Bulgaria at the peace conferences being conducted in Paris. He also desired to promulgate the global communist revolution. Tito and Dimitrov agreed that as a first phase, 93 Yugoslav "cultural" workers would enter the Pirin region to reeducate the people. This reeducation translated into the Titoists removing pictures of Bulgarian revolutionary heroes from schools and other buildings and replacing them with portraits of Tito and Kolishevski. BCP members were asked to take oaths of loyalty to Tito [16]. A groundswell of opposition began to erupt among BCP members, whose emotional comments may be summarized as follows (with apologies to Chomsky and Jesus Hernandez [17]) "...Bulgarian Communist leaders acted more like Serbian subjects than sons of the Bulgarian people. It may seem absurd, incredible, but our education under that brief Serbian tutelage had deformed us to such an extent that we were completely denationalized; our national soul was torn Out of us and replaced by a rabid chauvinistic internationalism..." By the end of 1948, Dimitrov began to realize that Tito's main aim was acquisition of territory to build a greater Yugoslavia rather than any Federation which might involve any sharing of power. Subsequently, Dimitrov attacked Tito's Macedonian policy as anti-Bulgarian, particularly as he and the BCP had acted in "good faith."[17] Stalin's final intervention against Tito and the YCP ended any further negotiations on the Pirin region between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Dimitrov immediately attached responsibility for the fiasco to Traycho Kostov and several other members of the BCP who were duly branded as agents of Tito and the YCP. It is an incredible irony that Stalin, often bungling the "Macedonian Question," was in fact largely responsible for the final salvation of the birthright of the people of Macedonia and the prevention of their assimilation into the Yugoslav state. Many Macedonians, particularly those in and from Yugoslavia, view Dimitrov as a legendary figure who had the strength and tenacity to proclaim the existence of a Macedonian nationality. The details presented herein establish that Dimitrov, in fact, attempted to use the Macedonian Bulgarian people to further his own narrow views of Communist internationalism. Towards this end, nothing else mattered. He was prepared to sacrifice not only the heritage of the Macedonian Bulgarian people, but the actual soil of his ancestors. Among Communist parties, Dimitrov and the BCP were the only group which would actually countenance such an undertaking. The fact that Dimitrov on his death was embalmed and placed in a mausoleum in Sofia is incomprehensible. (Dimitrov's body now has been removed from the heart of Sofia. He was cremated recently.) Dimitrov was the man who delivered the very bones of Gotse Delchev and the literary works of the people of Macedonia collected and preserved by IMRO and other patriots to their vilest adversaries. The Macedonian and Bulgarian people are a single entity. They are indelibly linked through a millennium of time and history. The fact that the people of Macedonia were separated by artificial boundaries in 1878 (Treaty of Berlin), 1913 (Treaty of Bucharest), and 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly) cannot change their heritage or their rights. Nor can the YCP simulate a new Macedonian race with its own language, culture and history. The Communists themselves have repeatedly acknowledged, then conveniently forgotten, the true status of the people of Macedonia. Consider the contents of the Manifesto to the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey prepared and delivered in April, 1920, by the Comintern [18]: " ..The Macedonian Bulgarians. the Albanians, the Montenegrins, the Croats and the Bosnians are rising up against the rule of the Serbian bureaucratic and landowning oligarchy.." Dimitar Vlahov, one of the main leaders of IMRO (United), a de facto extension of the YCP, in 1946 was elected a vice-president of the Yugoslav presidium [19]. However, his views on Gotse Delchev published in a jubilee issue of Makedonsko Delo (May 4, 1928, Vienna)to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Delchev's death must be noted: "...Gotse was a Bulgarian by nationality. he was educated in Bulgarian schools. Kukush, Salonica. Sofia. Although in the last two his education was in a spirit of narrow nationalism, Gotse regarded all Macedonians as his brothers. He struggled for the liberation of all Macedonians, not just the Macedonian Bulgarians. He did not struggle only for the Bulgarians in Macedonia to become the ruling nation, but rather that they and the other ethnic groups all be free..." Such beliefs are totally inconsistent with the Yugoslav concept of a unique Macedonian nationality. Yet Vlahov accepted one of the highest positions in the Yugoslav state. Can the sincerity or statements of such individuals continue to have any credibility? While people such as Vlahov succumbed to the intrigues of power and self-glorification and allowed themselves to be used as window-dressing by the Yugoslav state, others like Metodi Antonov-Cento took a firm stand on the basic principles of truth. As the President of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia, he resigned in 1946, citing the lack of self-determination afforded the Macedonian Republic. This denial foreshadowed the denationalization of the Macedonians' Bulgarian heritage with respect to their language and the dependence of Skopie on Serbian administrators and experts [20] Cento was quickly arrested as a "reactionary" and an IMRO member. In their excellent and objective appraisal of the Yugoslav state and Macedonia, Professors Palmer and King provide the true reasons for Belgrade's continuing falsification of the Macedonian question. A forgotten generation of the people of Macedonia and their children are only now awakening to the massive fraud perpetrated against them and their heritage. The unbiased facts are steadily emerging and gathering momentum as the collapse of the totalitarian Bulgarian government is witnessed. The sleeper has awakened. Reference 1.Christowe S. New Macedonia in "Macedonian Cultural Society lskra", (Michael Radin, ed), Macedonian Orthodox Community of Adelaide and South Australia, Inc., 1985, Vol. 5, p35-41 2.Anonymous. Tito's Crodocile Tears for Greek Macedonia. "Macedonian Spark", 1953, 7(9):1 3."The New Encyclopedia Britannica" (Goetz PW ed.), 15th ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 1988, Vol. it, p. 804-805 4.Beloff N., "Tito's Flawed Legacy, Yugoslavia & the West: 1939-84", Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London, 1985, p. 54 5.ibid., p 59 6.ibid., p. 81-83 7.Clissold, S., "Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-73: a documentary survey", Oxford University Press, London, l975,p. 153-156 8.Connor, W., "The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy", Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986, p. 161 9.McCagg, Jr., W.O., "Stain Embattled, 1943-48", Wayne University Press, Detroit, 1978, p. 53 10.Moser, C.A., "Dimitrnv of Bulgaria: A Political Biography of Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov", Caroline House Publishers, Ottawa, IL, 1979, p. 33-34 11.Petrovski, T., "Macedonian Emigration to the USA", Macedonian Review, Skopie, 1981, 11(1)102-110 12.Moser, C.A., ibid., p. 37 13.Moser, C.A., ibid., p. 198 14.Palmer, Jr., S. E. & King, R.R., "'Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question", The Shoe String Press, Inc., Hamden, CT, 1971, p. 125 15.Crampton, R.J., "A Short History of Bulgaria", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 171 16.Barker, E., "Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics", Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1950, p.105-107 17.Chomsky, N., "The Chomsky Reader", Peck, J, ed., Serpent's Tail London, 1988, p. 92 18.Connor, W., ibid., p. 132 19.Andonovski, H., "Revolutionary Work of Dimitar Vlahov", Macedonian Review, Skopie, 1978, 7(2):177-181 20.Palmer, Jr., S.E. & King, R. R., ibid., p. 137