Britain and France

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that neither the United Kingdom nor Western Europe wanted the reunification of Germany. Thatcher also clarified that she wanted the Soviet leader to do what he could to stop it, telling Gorbachev "We do not want a united Germany".[11] Although she welcomed East German democracy, Thatcher worried that a rapid reunification might weaken Gorbachev,[12] and favoured Soviet troops staying in East Germany as long as possible to act as a counterweight to a united Germany.[10]

Thatcher, who carried in her handbag a map of Germany's 1937 borders to show others the "German problem", feared that its "national character", size, and central location in Europe would cause the nation to be a "destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe".[12] In December 1989, she warned fellow European Community leaders at a Strasbourg, France summit Kohl attended, "We defeated the Germans twice! And now they're back!"[13][10] Although Thatcher had stated her support for German self-determination in 1985,[12] she now argued that Germany's allies had only supported reunification because they had not believed it would ever happen.[10] Thatcher favoured a transition period of five years for reunification, during which the two Germanys would remain separate states. Although she gradually softened her opposition, as late as March 1990 Thatcher summoned historians and diplomats to a seminar at Chequers[12] to ask "How dangerous are the Germans?"[13] and the French ambassador in London reported that Thatcher had told him, "France and Great Britain should pull together today in the face of the German threat."[14][15]

Similarly, a representative of French President François Mitterrand reportedly told an aide to Gorbachev, "France by no means wants German reunification, although it realises that in the end it is inevitable."[11] At the Strasbourg summit, Mitterrand and Thatcher discussed the fluidity of Germany's historical borders.[10] On 20 January 1990, Mitterrand told Thatcher that a unified Germany could "make more ground than even Hitler had".[14] He predicted that "bad" Germans would reemerge,[13] who might seek to regain former German territory lost after World War II[12] and would likely dominate Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, leaving "only Romania and Bulgaria for the rest of us". The two leaders saw no way to prevent reunification, however, as "None of us was going to declare war on Germany".[10] Mitterrand recognized before Thatcher that reunification was inevitable and adjusted his views accordingly; unlike her, he was hopeful that participation in a single currency[12] and other European institutions could control a united Germany. Mitterrand still wanted Thatcher to publicly oppose unification, however, to obtain more concessions from Germany.[13]
[edit] The rest of Europe

Other European leaders' opinion of reunification was "icy". Italy's Giulio Andreotti warned against a revival of "pan-Germanism", and the Netherlands' Ruud Lubbers questioned the German right to self-determination. They shared Britain and France's concerns over a return to German militarism and the economic power of a reunified nation. The consensus opinion was that reunification, if it must occur, should not occur until at least 1995 and preferably much later.[10]
[edit] The four powers
“ The United States – and President George H. W. Bush – recognized that Germany had gone through a long democratic transition. It had been a good friend, it was a member of NATO. Any issues that had existed in 1945, it seemed perfectly reasonable to lay them to rest. For us, the question wasn't should Germany unify? It was how and under what circumstances? We had no concern about a resurgent Germany... ”

—Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[16]

The victors of World War II—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France, comprising the Four-Power Authorities—retained authority over Berlin, such as control over air travel and its political status. The Soviet Union sought early to use reunification as a way to push Germany out of NATO into neutrality, removing nuclear weapons from its territory. West Germany interpreted a 21 November 1989 diplomatic message on the topic, however, as meaning that only two weeks after the Wall's collapse the Soviet leadership already anticipated reunification. This belief, and the worry that his rival Genscher might act first, encouraged Kohl on 28 November to announce a detailed reunification plan (10-Point Plan). While his speech was very popular within West Germany Kohl's speech caused concern among other European governments, with whom he had not discussed the plan.[10]

The Americans did not share the Europeans' and Russians' historical fears over German expansionism, but wished to ensure that Germany would stay within NATO. In December 1989, the administration of President George H. W. Bush made a united Germany's continued NATO membership a requirement for supporting reunification. Kohl agreed, although less than 20% of West Germans supported remaining within NATO; he also wished to avoid a neutral Germany, as he believed that would destroy NATO, cause the United States and Canada to leave Europe, and Britain and France would form an alliance. The United States increased its support of Kohl's policies, as it feared that otherwise Oskar Lafontaine, a critic of NATO, might become Chancellor.[10]
Helmut Kohl became first chancellor of a reunified Germany.

Horst Teltschik, Kohl's foreign policy advisor, later recalled that Germany would have paid "100 billion deutschmarks" had the Soviets demanded it. The USSR did not make such great demands, however, with Gorbachev stating in February 1990 that "The Germans must decide for themselves what path they choose to follow". In May 1990 he repeated his remark in the context of NATO membership while meeting Bush, amazing both the Americans and Germans.[10]
[edit] Conclusion

During a NATO-Warsaw Pact conference in Ottawa, Canada, Genscher persuaded the four powers to treat the two Germanys as equals instead of defeated junior partners, and for the six nations to negotiate alone. Although the Dutch, Italians, Spanish, and other NATO powers opposed such a structure, which meant that the alliance's boundaries would change without their participation, the six nations began negotiations in March 1990. After Gorbachev's May agreement on German NATO membership, the Soviets further agreed that Germany would be treated as an ordinary NATO country, with the exception that former East German territory would not have foreign NATO troops or nuclear weapons. In exchange, Kohl agreed to reduce the sizes of both Germanys' militaries, renounce weapons of mass destruction, and accept the postwar Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern border. In addition, Germany agreed to pay about 55 billion deutschmarks to the Soviet Union in gifts and loans, the equivalent of eight days of the West German GDP.[10]

Mitterrand agreed to reunification in exchange for a commitment from Kohl to the European Economic and Monetary Union.[17] The British insisted to the end, against Soviet opposition, that NATO be allowed to hold maneuvers in the former East Germany. After the Americans intervened,[10] both the UK and France ratified the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in September 1990, thus finalizing the reunification for purposes of international law. Thatcher later wrote that her opposition to reunification had been an "unambiguous failure".[12]

Редактирано от Цakи на 13.05.12 18:41.