върнах се вече, но имам много работа. А бе я виж какво пишат ония ченгета на
ЦРУ от "Старфор". Щели да се изтеглят американците от Косово, защото всичко
било пълно фиаско. И освен това аргументите им за интервенцията били чисто
морални, хуманитарни, де.(Де го Пешо да извика: Наглост! Поредната!)
А иначе за Хайдер може и да се разберем.
Kosovo: The United States Looking For an Exit
February 7, 2000
Summary
The United States is moving to redefine its policy in Kosovo. The
immediate reason can be found in the deteriorating situation on the
ground. Last week, violence intensified between ethnic Albanians and
Serbs; this was not something that the United States bargained for when
it intervened last year. For this and a host of other reasons, it
appears that Washington is now in the process of redefining its role and
quite possibly preparing to withdraw its forces.
Analysis
Increasingly, there are signs that the United States is looking for a
way to reposition itself in Kosovo, nearly a year after leading NATO
forces into a conflict over the province. Last week in Europe, U.S.
Defense Secretary William Cohen suggested that U.S. forces are facing
“mission creep” which neither military commanders nor political leaders
want. In addition, a case is building in Washington that blames Europe
for doing too little to help control Kosovo. And in the last week, the
city of Mitrovica in Kosovo has been the scene of the very violence and
chaos that NATO has always sought to avoid.
Ever since NATO intervened in Kosovo nearly a year ago, one of the most
interesting exercises has been the attempt of serious analysts and
Balkan residents to uncover the hidden reason behind the U.S.-led
intervention last March. The official reason for the conflict was that
the United States wanted to stop genocide in Kosovo. Particularly in
Europe, this was seen as a public justification masking a hidden agenda.
Theories suggested that hidden mines or even the control of the
telecommunications industry were the true reasons for intervention. An
entire industry was spawned to uncover the motives behind the two and a
half month-long conflict.
The reality, however, is far more prosaic and, in some ways, more
alarming. The U.S.-led intervention was prompted precisely by what the
U.S. government said. There were reports of an impending holocaust in
Kosovo. Criticized for failing to prevent genocide in Rwanda and accused
of sitting idly by in Bosnia, the Clinton administration was afraid of
another public relations nightmare – at a time when domestic scandals
were tarnishing the administration anyway.
The administration viewed Kosovo as a low-risk, high-yield operation.
The administration did not expect an extended conflict, having drawn the
belief in Bosnia that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was
incapable of enduring an extended bombing campaign. Expecting a
repetition of events in Bosnia – when a brief bombing campaign was
followed by quick capitulation – the administration was caught
flat-footed when the war dragged on. The United States had been suckered
into a war of limited strategic interest from which the United States
could not withdraw. Milosevic, after all, had been portrayed as a
monster. And the administration could not negotiate with a monster.
NATO and the United States ultimately engineered a victory, of sorts,
last June when NATO forces occupied Kosovo. But their arrival did not
bring anything like closure. Quite to the contrary, the alliance began
an open-ended occupation in which the mission did not correspond to the
reality on the ground. The mission of NATO forces was to ensure the
security of all residents. The reality was that NATO forces were, quite
against their intentions, acting as the agents of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA). The ethnic Albanian guerrillas used the NATO peacekeeping
mission as a means for institutionalizing KLA rule in the province. The
effect was to turn victims into victimizers and NATO peacekeepers into
unwitting tools of ethnic Albanian revenge.
In this situation, NATO has never managed to find its balance or its
center of gravity. NATO troops have managed to alienate all sides – a
fact underscored by the ongoing violence in Mitrovica. On a larger
scale, neither Washington nor Brussels had ever faced a simple fact. In
the region, the prevailing view is that neutral benevolence is
impossible; for NATO troops, there was no neutral standpoint from which
to mount their operation. It was inevitable that the peacekeepers would
find themselves caught in the crossfire between Albanians, determined to
keep what they think they have won, and Serbs, increasingly determined
to recover what they have lost. Milosevic remains in control in
Belgrade. Nothing has been settled.
For the United States, the Kosovo experience violates the key lessons of
the Vietnam experience. Withdrawing from Southeast Asia nearly 20 years
ago, the United States swore never to again become embroiled, on the
ground, in a civil war in another country. In Kosovo, the United States
has been involved in something worse: a civil war that offers no clear
exit strategy. The war, after all, cannot truly end until one warring
ethnic group, or the other, is completely expelled from the region.
Worse, this civil war is one in which the United States has no real
stake. In Vietnam, at least, some sort of strategic logic could be
asserted. But this has not been the case in Kosovo, where the driving
motive for U.S. involvement has been based on humanitarian motives.
The humanitarian question is now cutting the other way as peacekeepers
are turned from saviors into confused bullies in the minds of even the
Albanians. This transformation is not the fault of the troops, who are
still mostly combat soldiers, trained to respond to threats with
overwhelming force. Keeping the peace, particularly in a chaotic
situation, requires a very different sort of training – the sort that is
given to police, of which there are still precious few in Kosovo.
More than having the right training, a policeman is someone who is
local. NATO has taken people who were never trained as police in the
first place, tossed them into an utterly alien culture – and is now
discovering that the solution is not working.
It appears that the administration is slowly recognizing the insanity of
the situation. In Munich last week, Cohen reportedly said, “I think it
has reached the level of concern on the part of not only members of the
U.S. Congress, but military commanders. They are concerned about the
possibility of mission creep – that the military is being called upon to
engage in police functions for which they are not properly trained and
we don't want them to carry out." The administration has acknowledged
that the situation is getting out of hand, that forces are not trained
for the mission and that no one now wants them to carry out the mission.
Most intriguing is Cohen’s reference to mission creep; there has, of
course, been none. The nature of the mission has remained the same. But
increasingly, there is perception of creep: the administration’s
perception has finally caught up with the reality of the mission it so
enthusiastically undertook nearly a year ago.
As a result, administration officials and Congress members are looking
for the exit. Since total withdrawal of NATO forces is impossible
without even more chaos, another solution is appearing: Blame the
Europeans and demand that they shoulder more of the burden. Sen. John
Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has claimed
that the real problem in Kosovo is that Europeans have not fulfilled
their obligations. They were supposed to send police, as well as $35
million for policing functions, but only a few of the former and none of
the latter have arrived.
European countries have agreed to take command of the peacekeeping
operation. By April, a Eurocorps contingent is scheduled to command the
NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR). More than 350 personnel from the
five Eurocorps countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and
Spain – are to take command of the 50,000 troops in Kosovo. This of
course does not solve the core problem. It may even compound it. The
United States, desperately wanting to minimize exposure and casualties,
will now find its forces under the control of a headquarters with its
own agenda.
The Europeans, however, are not eager to undertake full responsibility
for KFOR. Except for the British government, the rest of Europe was more
than a little restrained in enthusiasm for the war. Most European
governments foresaw precisely the situation that has developed. The
European view has always been that the United States stumbled into a
situation for which they had counseled caution.
But there are far deeper issues for European governments at this point.
One is Russia. The emergence of acting President Vladimir Putin and a
much more assertive, anti-Western Russia is a result of last year’s war.
European governments regard the end game of Kosovo, in which the
Russians were outmaneuvered and humiliated, as a Pyrrhic victory. The
Germans in particular now must deal with an increasingly truculent
Russia – in which they have invested billions that they will never again
see – and are not eager to be the flag-bearers of an operation that
continues to irritate the Russians.
Indeed, the Russian factor is likely one reason that the United States
wants out. Washington’s relationship with Moscow is increasingly
dangerous. Rhetoric aside, the upcoming Sino-Russian summit in March
presents a serious threat to global American interests. The United
States does not want to see a deepening of the Sino-Russian
relationship. Instead, Washington needs to signal that the U.S. presence
in Kosovo does not present a strategic threat to the Russians. Beginning
the process of withdrawal would help enormously. The problem with this
strategy is that Europeans are not likely to replace Americans as the
objects of Russian ire.
As U.S. troops are caught in the crossfire between Kosovo factions, the
basic irrationality of the operation becomes apparent. Having entered a
civil war, the United States lacks both the will and resources to impose
a settlement. The settlement at hand, a fully Albanian Kosovo, cleansed
of Serbs, is intolerable. A NATO withdrawal, and the re-entry of the
Yugoslav Army, is unthinkable. In addition, U.S. forces are strained by
their dispersal around the globe with little strategic reason.
An exit from Kosovo will emerge as an issue in the months to come,
particularly in the context of an American presidential election. The
Clinton administration is setting the stage for the withdrawal of at
least some forces from Kosovo, leaving the Europeans to handle it. It is
far from clear that the Europeans will do it. With both strategic and
political considerations coinciding, Clinton seems likely to try to trim
the military commitment in Kosovo. However, having stumbled into it, it
is not clear that he will now be able to stumble out. Nevertheless, he
seems to be cranking up to give it his best shot.
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