А какво искаш да ти кажа! Да се радвам, като тебе че с цената на още убити хора можеш да докажеш колко сме "кръвожадни"? Защо Безродник не започне да си вади изводи за американската полиция на основание на разстрела на учениците в Тексас? Такива като тебе и него съм ги виждал в Израел, повече отколкото можеш да си представиш. И не аз, а вие избягвате неудобните въпроси, като примера с Индонезия, където НИТО ЕДИН човек не отговори конкретно на зададения въпрос. Хайде пак от мен да мине ще ти отворя пак малко очите. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ По повод на твоите твърдения, че НАТО нищо не правило. Виж количеството на войските на ООН и ги сравни с армията, която НАТО държи в района. Кой друг може да си го позволи и на кого трябва да разчитат тези които не могат да се защитят сами? Кто предоставляет персонал и имущество? Все государства-члены делят риск, с которым связана деятельность по поддержанию мира и безопасности. С 1945 года в различные периоды свой персонал предоставляли 110 стран; в настоящее время миротворцев предоставляют 70 стран. По состоянию на 18 февраля 1998 года больше всего военнослужащих для действующих в настоящее время миссий предоставили следующие страны: Польша (1053 военнослужащих); Бангладеш (924); Австрия (858); Гана (782); Финляндия (768); и Норвегия (722). Небольшое островное государство Фиджи принимало участие практически во всех миротворческих операциях Организации Объединенных Наций; то же самое можно сказать о Канаде. Даже государства, не являющиеся членами Организации Объединенных Наций, вносят свой вклад: например, Швейцария предоставляет для операций по поддержанию мира денежные средства, медицинские подразделения, самолеты и вертолеты и другую технику и имущество. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ А ето ти малко материал, за да не говориш, че през 1995 година, НАТО си е "запечатал ушите и зашил устата". По- добре си помисли защо руснаците този път се отметнаха и започнаха да крещят против. A three-week air campaign in the fall of 1995 was the decisive factor in bringing the recalcitrant Serbs to the peace talks in Dayton Deliberate Force By John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor On Aug. 28, 1995, an artillery shell ripped through the stalls of an open market in Sarajevo, Bosnia, killing 38 civilians and maiming or injuring 85 others. For the leaders of a joint United Nations­NATO force charged with protecting refugee "safe areas" like Sarajevo, it was seen as the last straw after a lengthy spree of deal-breaking attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. Joint Force leaders quickly moved to exercise their internationally granted authority to launch "disproportionate" retaliation. A three-week campaign--called Deliberate Force--was launched. It included some artillery fire, but it was dominated by airpower, the weight of which hammered the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons, ammunition depots, command-and-control bunkers, and other targets. At the same time, NATO air forces undertook a parallel operation called Dead Eye, which took down the Serbian Soviet-style air defense network. Within three weeks of the first bomb on target, recalcitrant Serb leaders agreed to enter serious negotiations with their foes in the three-year-old war. Within two months, the Dayton Accords had been signed, effectively bringing the war to a halt. The operation is regarded as the prime modern example of how judicious use of airpower, coupled with hard-nosed diplomacy, can stop a ground force in its tracks and bring the worst of enemies to the bargaining table. It also illustrated that years of working together had made NATO an efficient fighting force, though one heavily dependent on US contributions of airpower, satellite and airborne reconnaissance, and electronic jamming. In November 1995, President Clinton said that the US "led NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes, many of them flown by skilled and brave American pilots. Those air strikes, together with the renewed determination of our European partners and the Bosnian [Muslim] and Croat gains on the battlefield, convinced the Serbs, finally, to start thinking about making peace." "Impressed and Awed" Then­Defense Secretary William J. Perry said the belligerents were "just sick of the war" but that another factor was that "the warring parties were impressed and awed at the military capability of the United States and NATO." He went on, "They got a sample of that during the bombing raids. They witnessed our military power, but they also came to believe that, in the context of an agreement, that power would be used constructively--not to harm them but to enforce the peace. That was the solid foundation which allowed them ... to make the necessary compromises to reach this peace agreement." Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, special US negotiator in the Balkans and primary architect of the Dayton peace accords, told AFA's 1996 National Convention that Deliberate Force was the decisive factor in bringing the Serbs to the peace table. Holbrooke flatly declared that the diplomatic effort wouldn't have succeeded "without the United States Air Force and Navy and the precision bombing." Holbrooke said he believed at the time of Deliberate Force that "more bombing" would lead to better diplomacy. "And it was true," he said. The American The US Air Force supplied 69 percent of US aircraft assigned to NATO for the Balkan campaign, and the Navy and Marine Corps the rest. The US also made available these nonassigned supporting forces: USAF: U-2R, RAF Fairford, UK; RC-135, RAF Mildenhall, UK; F-16C, Aviano AB, Italy; and F-15E, RAF Lakenheath, UK. US Navy: F-14, Adriatic Sea; P-3C, NAS Sigonella, Italy; E-2, Adriatic Sea; S-3, Adriatic Sea; HH-60, Adriatic Sea. USMC: AV-8B, Adriatic Sea. Of the bombing, he observed, "The precision of it, its immediate and visible effects on the negotiations, made a real difference. Those people who argue about airpower have got to stop arguing only about Vietnam and talk about what can be done in the [Persian] Gulf, what was done in Bosnia." Paul G. Kaminski, who was then DoD's top weapons official, told an Air Force Academy audience on May 2, 1996, that Deliberate Force surpassed even Desert Storm as a demonstration of modern airpower. "In Desert Storm, only two percent of all weapons expended during the air war were precision guided munitions," he said. "In Bosnia, they accounted for over 90 percent of all ordnance expended by US forces." Kaminski went on to suggest that the United States had entered a radically new warfare era. "The bomb damage assessment photographs in Bosnia bear no resemblance to photos of the past, where the target, often undamaged, is surrounded by craters," said Kaminski. "The photos from Bosnia usually showed one crater where the target used to be, with virtually no collateral damage." He concluded, "We are moving closer to a situation known as 'one target, one weapon.' It was actually more than one-but less than two-weapons per target in Operation Deliberate Force. This has been the promise for the past 20 years; now it is becoming a reality." Considering the scale of the results, Deliberate Force was an economical use of power. It took just 3,515 NATO air sorties--about a day's work in the 1991 Gulf War--to get the Serbs to negotiate in earnest. Of those sorties, about 60 percent were flown by "shooters." These combat aircraft released 1,026 munitions, 708 of which were precision guided. Though the weather was often bad, the well-trained and disciplined aircrews got virtually everything they aimed at, hitting 97 percent of the targets and destroying or inflicting serious damage on more than 80 percent of them. The targets themselves--338 individual aim points within 48 "complexes"--were checked and rechecked and painstakingly selected so as to virtually eliminate the risk to civilian life and property. Deliberate Force was an achievement on a scale that even airpower proponents did not anticipate. Shortly after Operation Desert Storm, the USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Merrill McPeak, told a Senate committee not to expect too much from airpower in the Balkan context. Mountainous terrain, heavy foliage, and bad weather would conspire to prevent the kind of success seen in the Gulf War, he said, where targets were easier to find in the flat, open desert under typically clear skies. "Imagine flying over the Blue Ridge Mountains at 600 miles an hour ... in overcast ... and picking out the right target somewhere down there in the woods," McPeak had said, illustrating the difficulties airpower would face in Bosnia. However, the Air Force had been busy since then, equipping far more of its airplanes with precision weapon capability than had been the case in the desert. "Deliberate Force extended a trend which began with the Vietnam War," Air Force Secretary Sheila E. Widnall said at the 1996 AFA Air Warfare Symposium. Up From Vietnam In Vietnam, only two-tenths of one percent of the bombs used were precision guided, she noted. In Desert Storm, "contrary to the general perception of its having been a 'video war,' only about nine percent of our bombs were precision guided. In Deliberate Force, over 60 percent of the bombs dropped by the NATO force were precision guided." The Dominance of Precision Planning for Deliberate Force began back in September 1994, when NATO defense ministers met in Spain to discuss possibilities for using airpower to stem the ever-worsening Balkan war. They used it two months later against Krajina AB in Serb-held Croatia, which had been used to launch attacks against the UN-guaranteed Bihac "safe area"--one of several where refugees were supposed to have a haven from attack. Serb surface-to-air missiles were fired against the NATO airplanes, which returned fire. The use of airpower was sporadic, however--not the sustained campaign many believed was necessary to influence the Serbs. NATO had carried out Deny Flight, enforcement of a no-fly zone over the Balkans, but that did not have much impact on the ground. NATO developed Operation Dead Eye as a response to the Bosnian Serb air defense threat. Should the call come for an air campaign, it would target air defense communications, command-and-control nodes, early-warning radar sites, known SAM sites, and related support facilities. Simultaneously, NATO began the planning for Deliberate Force, the strike campaign which would be unleashed if the Serbs failed to respect the UN-identified "safe areas" and comply with other cease-fire terms. The target list concentrated on Serb heavy weapons, such as large artillery and tanks, command-and-control centers, dedicated military support facilities, and lines of communication. The UN and NATO were extremely patient with the Serbs--critics said too much restraint was exercised--as the Serbs moved toward and attacked the safe areas. NATO and the UN were blocked by divisions among members. "We had piecemealed airpower, in a way--for lots of reasons--over the course of Deny Flight," said Gen. Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff nominee and then-commander of NATO southern air forces, who oversaw Deliberate Force. Without "a sustained effort," Ryan said, airpower was not "taken seriously by the warring factions." As 1995 unfolded, Bosnian Serb defiance of UN mandates grew routine. From "weapons collection points" outside Sarajevo where they were to turn in certain kinds of armaments, the Serbs began shelling the city and reclaiming surrendered weapons. Shelling in May was met with limited air strikes on Serbian ammo dumps. In retaliation, the Serbs took UN hostages, then in June shot down Capt. Scott O'Grady's F-16 with a SAM, proving that the Integrated Air Defense System from the dismembered Yugoslavia--including SA-2 and SA-6 missiles and man-portable air defense weapons--was still active and potent. No Penalty In July, the Serbs overran the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and set their sights on Gorazde. On a roll, the Serbs had little to lose by defying UN admonitions to leave the safe areas alone, as the "penalty" air attacks had not been unleashed. NATO and UN ministers agreed that trying to appease the Serbs and hoping for better behavior on their part was proving futile and humiliating and that, with each defiance, their organizations looked paralyzed and unable to act decisively. In late July, the NATO/UN ministers agreed that an attack on Gorazde would be "met by substantial and decisive airpower." Any attack on a safe area, by troops, artillery or aircraft, or the massing of forces or heavy weapons in preparation for such an attack, would trigger a "disproportionate" response in the form of bombing anywhere in the "wider area" of Serb operations. Ryan was to "build the campaign" of air attacks. His instructions were to get the Serbs' attention and compel them to stop the "wanton shelling" of the safe areas. "We were not at war with any faction," Ryan explained, and that included the Bosnian Serbs, "so it was not an attack that was meant to take away or destroy their army. It was an attack to take away the military capability they had ... that made them dominant." Once the Serbs "realized what was happening" and that they were losing their edge against their enemies, Ryan reasoned, the Serbs would comply with UN mandates, fearing their enemies would move to take advantage of the disruption of Serbian forces. The Serbian strengths centered on "their command and control, which was very, very good--intricate, interconnected, and redundant," Ryan noted. The command-and-control network allowed the Serbs to move their forces--which were outnumbered by those of the Muslims and Croats--quickly to where they were needed. A network of ammunition dumps and vehicle parks also meant that the Bosnian Serb army didn't have to lug around lots of armor and supplies and so could move faster. The combination of command and control with scattered ammo and vehicle supplies was what gave the Serbs their edge. Then, "if we could take away their mobility by taking down some very key ... lines of communications," the Serbs wouldn't be able to move forces quickly, communicate, or resupply, Ryan said. Such targets would include "some bridges" and roads. "We minimized that because we didn't want to do any more damage to this poor nation that had been beat up so long," Ryan added. If the bombing campaign had the desired effect of taking away the Serb strengths, "and they realized it was happening to them," Ryan said, Deliberate Force would work. However, "they would not realize it unless we had a sustained operation that would show them that we really meant business." When the Sarajevo market was hit by the artillery round on Aug. 28, Adm. Leighton W. Smith Jr., commander of NATO's Southern Region, and his UN counterpart, French Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, agreed it was time to launch the bombing campaign. The two had to agree to the action under a "dual key" system put in place to assure that the attacks were mutually agreed to and approved. On Aug. 29, the order came for Deliberate Force to commence at 2 a.m. the next day. UN forces in Gorazde--deemed to be at risk of being taken hostage by Serbs--were to quietly leave their positions.