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Не знам кой как е превеждал, но точните думи на Саакашвили, са:
"Il problema non e se e stata la Georgia a iniziare le azioni militari. Ammettiamo di avere lanciato quelle azioni, ma avevamo forse un’altra scelta mentre i nostri cittadini venivano uccisi?"
"Проблемът не е дали Грузия е започнала военните действия. Ние признаваме, че предприехме тези действия, но може би имахме друг избор, при положение, че гражданите ни биваха избивани?"
Тези граждани сами са измирали от естествена смърт или какво?! Не разбирам по пътя на коя логика, от горните две изречения преводачите са стигнали до "Да, в Осетия ние атакувахме първи."
Лично аз не виждам нищо ново и никаква промяна в позицията, изказана от Саакашвили, а именно - че Грузия е предприела военна операция в отговор на атаките и придвижването на руско тежко въоръжение към грузинските села, разположени северно от Цхинвали.
И понеже, разбирам, че голяма част от българските медии превеждат не от оригиналния източник, а от руския превод, който намирам за крайно тенденциозен във ваденето на думи от контекста, ето ви , пред парламентарната комисия, разследваща войната:
Ad hoc Commission of the Parliament of Georgia on Investigation of the Military Aggression and other Acts Conducted by the Russian Federation aimed at Violating the Territorial Integrity of Georgia
Presided by the Chairman of the Investigative Commission Mr. Paata Davitaia
28 November, 2008
Chairman.
Please, let me greet all and let me greet Mr. President. Thank you very much for coming. This temporary Parliamentary Commission has been created in accordance to the parliament resolution in order to investigate August events. The mandate of the temporary parliamentary commission did not envisage to summon the President. You expressed your willingness to come to us here. So, are you ready to co-operate with the temporary parliamentary commission and provide information within your competence?
M. Saakashvili.
Of course, Batono Paata, following our conversation several weeks ago I am ready for a thorough co-operate with the parliamentary commission and, of course, I am ready to give irrefragable answers to all your questions, as well as questions of our people and those existing throughout the world.
Chairman.
Thank you very much. Mr. President, the way of our work is to put several questions. You will answer them and the further format of our work will be like this. As we know, August events, which took place in Georgia, have not started... open aggression against Georgia did not start in August. This had certain preconditions. People have many critical questions concerning this issue. Therefore, I would like to ask you why Georgia could not prevent this conflict, or, to be more precise, could not avoid running into this provocation. Did it (Georgia) do its best in its diplomatic activities in order to prevent escalation of the conflict and was everything done by Georgia to achieve this? As we know, in February you met the President of Russia, Putin, and afterwards President Medvedev relevantly in Moscow and Astana. Did you have an impression after the meeting that Russia was preparing for the military aggression, which took place already in August? These are the questions you are requested to answer, to be followed by some other additional questions as well.
M. Saakashvili.
Batono Paata, I have noted all your questions. If the Commission does not mind, I would like to make a statement first and afterwards answer all questions in detail. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation regarding the fact of creation of this commission. I would like to say that this is an evident proof and demonstration of the fact that Georgia is continuing its way to democratization. What is happening now in the Parliament is a really historic process and I have honour to be part of this historic process. All of us, together with other friends of mine, have been creators of the history of Georgian parliamentarism. All of us together have been building these institutions, but since adoption of our new Constitution, the President has never made an official visit to the Parliament except the occasions of his annual addresses to the Parliament. I would also like to note that MPs here represent both majority and opposition, but the Chairman is a representative of opposition. There are members of several opposition parties here and I would like to remind that a year ago we and some of the opposition party members were on different sides, of course - not of the barricades, but some of us were in the building whilst others were definitely out of the building and there was almost an insuperable chasm separating us. We still have serious discrepancies, but the fact - that we could all gather in one hall and in one building willing to answer all questions; argue till loss of voice; do not agree; criticize each other, sometimes, even very harshly, but do place everything into the parliamentary and institutional frames of Georgia - is a step made really forward. I would also like to admit that many countries, in case they were facing aggression of the scale having place and still going on against Georgia... I would like to tell everyone - we already know this anyway, especially those foreigners, some of which sometimes would like to forget what is going on. Although, the other day the President of Poland, I think, clearly reminded all his European colleagues, what situation we are in. The occupant army is openly and illegally staying in several kilometers from Tbilisi carrying out shameless occupation of the territory of a sovereign state openly threatening its citizens by use of arms.
In the situation like this many of the countries would be tempted to harden their political systems, shut up their opposition and mass media, as well as control economy, but the fact, that we all together agreed we should have more freedom for press and right expression, we should have more discussions at the Parliament, more rights for the Parliament of Georgia, that we should carry on with our court reforms and at last create this commission, which, obviously, is unique – I believe, is our joint response to the aggressive actions. Our response to the aggression is more democracy, more transparency, more flexibility and demonstration of the fact that our immunity is in this freedom. Of course, a democratic system has its weaknesses as well, but its strong sides will prevent our opponents from causing harm to us and our future. Therefore, we will not leave any questions without answers – the government members had strict instructions to answer every single question. I appreciate your initiative to invite all kinds of people here, listen to everyone’s opinions: some of which were coinciding whilst others – differing. You have listened to truth and lie, but I hope your judgment will be objective. There are really very many questions existing not only in Georgia, but abroad as well. And as I see it, the main concern of the international community today is the question whether Georgia started military actions beginning of August in order to take a control over certain places in Tskhinvali and South Ossetia, having been out of our control before. You know that this question is considered to be the key question of the debates due to a very expensive campaign of the opponent. It (opponent) spends hundreds of millions to prove that we were the first to start, thus doing its best to get its expenses "laundered”, but we all know that "a raven can not be laundered” (meaning the Georgian saying that ‘you can not make a raven become white even if you rub it with sand’). Our opponent is trying to darken colours round Georgia and make picture vague thus preventing people to see where is truth and where is a lie. This is what their big campaigns are serving for. We have seen how different people have been bribed to let them lie. I would like to admit that this campaign really has a certain impact in case of some personalities. But this question in fact is an attempt to shift focus from really significant questions. But neither me, nor government other members have ever denied the fact the issue exists.
The answer to your question – whether we carried military actions at the beginning of August in order to have Tskhinvali and South Ossetian uncontrolled territories under our control – has been earlier and remains unchanged that yes, we took a decision to carry out military actions in Tskhinvali region.
This was a difficult decision, which would be taken by any democratic authorities responsible towards its country and nation in order to protect security of its own motherland and citizens. This decision was inevitable because of 2 core reasons.
First. We had learnt that hundreds of tanks of the Russian army, heavy materiel, artillery equipment and thousands of soldiers were on the Georgian-Russian border, near the Roki tunnel. We started getting true and justified information, data and figures of which you have already seen, from our intelligence that they started moving and crossing the Georgian border.
This fact was later endorsed by the world information media. Telephone conversations were publicized. Plenty of material, obtained from internet and other open- as well as arguable sources, was investigated. It should be admitted though that information from open sources are as much convincing as information of the intelligence, some times even more convincing. Even the Russian Federation could not deny the fact of incursion of its armed forces into Georgia.
On the previous day of intervention (I mean the wide scale intervention, as it was a continuation of the violation having started already at the beginning of August), 6 August, our peace keepers were killed. That night and the following day they were bombing non-stop and intensively those villages which were controlled by us. I would like to stress that these were not Georgian villages. These were villages with mixed population of ethnic Georgians and Ossetians. We had never separated them and they had been under control of the authorities of Georgia. We have been protected there people of all ethnicities and will be protecting them in future. We have been always equally treating them with love and respect. When the intensive bombing started the disposition of the artillery of the opposing party was mainly in Tskhinvali and round the places where the so called Russian Peace Keepers were located. This, by the way, was confirmed by Kulakhmetov himself. In such circumstances the issue to be raised is not whether Georgia carried out military activities in Tskhinvali region aiming at annihilation of weapon emplacements bombing our villages. There is no need to raise the question on this issue, because we did exactly so and this is not a secret. The question to be raised is which authorities or responsible to its people government would act in a different way when aggressors of another country were annihilating our population of all ethnicities in their own houses, when our sovereign territories were being occupied through intervention of the armed forces of an aggressor country.
No one should forget this. Some often mix up things listing Georgia, Russia and territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia between them. This is not just a territory, or an uninhabited place which does not belong to anyone. This is an internationally acknowledged sovereign territory within the state borders of Georgia, most of which had always been controlled by the central government of Georgia even after Georgia regained its independence.
Thus, we fought off to prevent foreign intervention rather than break into our territory because a country can not trespass on its own territory. We had been fighting on our territory, on our own motherland in order to defend our country in accordance with international law. None of the Georgian solders have stepped on the territory of another country. Therefore, the main criteria according to which legitimacy of the actions of Russia can be estimated should be not the question whether the democratically elected government of Georgia tried to defend its country or not, but answers to the following questions:
---------- Was it Georgia or Russia the side which in fact annexed the sovereign territory of the neighbouring country?
---------- Was it Georgia or Russia, who breached the agreement on limitation of armaments on the Caucasian flank one year before that and drastically increased number of military forces and armoured materiel in the Norther Caucasus while Georgia was staying part of the agreement? It was obvious that this was much more than they needed for their military operations even in Chechnya or other republics of the North Caucasus. It was obvious why they decided to be mo longer part of the agreement.
--------- Who was the country having crossed the border of the neighbouring democratic country with its tanks and thousands of soldiers?
--------- Which country has been organizing a whole series of provocations for months and years resulting in death of people?
---------- Which country distributed illegally passports to the population of the neighbouring country having thus breached the law of both our and their own countries in order to later carry out intervention with the pretext of protecting its citizens?
---------- Which country refused to take part in the peace negotiations organized by the EU on 25 July and by the OSCE on 31 July?
----------- Which country rejected the peace offer organized by the Foreign Minister of Germany Steinmaier?
------------ Who tried to disguise its well planned intervention with a false accusation as if 2000 peaceful citizens were killed in Tskhinvali -the fact that was immediately refuted by all international organizations, unbiased observers and later Russian official authorities themselves?
------------ Which country started military operations with the pretext that it was stopping genocide?
-------------Which country started and is still carrying out ethnic cleansing of the population which country?
-------------Having breached the agreement on cease fire signed by itself, which country refused to protect the territories envisaged by at least the first stage, as well as refused to let European Monitors enter the conflict zone after the military operations were over?
These are the real questions to be asked needing to be answered. And the fact that there is no single answer existing in favour of Russia once again stresses what a big and dangerous aggressor we and the rest of the world are dealing with as well as the fact that our strategic decisions and tactic reaction in the most difficult situation had no other alternatives. I am ready to answer any question. I would like to tell you that this was a very difficult decision.
As for your question, Batono Paata, regarding the meeting in February with the President Putin, I would say that my last meeting with Putin was very difficult. He stated (Mr David Bakradze and Mr. Grigol Vashadze were also there) that they would have bilateral relations with Georgia – resume flights, might think of allowing import of your wines, but as for your – no he did not say "your” - these disputable territories – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – we shall answer not you regarding these territories, but the West – United States and NATO – in the light of Kosovo. On this, please, do not feel nervous. This is not the matter of your concern. What we are up to will not be against you. It will be our reaction towards their actions. This was a statement made with utmost cynicism and we left the meeting very heavyhearted. We repeated to him there what we had told him for many times before - that we were ready to discuss any disputable issue and that there was nothing untouchable except the territorial integrity of Georgia and that we were open to any dialogue on all other issues. It is clear that Russia did not wish to listen to this. And when we left I asked David Bakradze (I think this was Bakradze’s first meeting with Putin. I had this pleasure many times in the past ... ) what his impression about the meeting was. And he told me that his impression was very heavy, that he thought Putin was threatening us with war... literally. I told him that my impression was also nearly the same.
Afterwards you mentioned a meeting with Medvedev in June. I went to this meeting with a hope that now we are dealing with a really new President of Russia, who graduated from the Faculty of Law nearly the same time with me and that, as we knew at least from our open sources, had never served at the KGB. We thought this could be a positive factor in order to find a "common language” with him. He used to say that he liked contemporary music and a modern way of life. He seemed to be inclined to smile and made an impression of an open personality, at least on the TV. This is why I went to the meeting with him with great pleasure.
I would like to admit that from the standpoint of climate of the meeting it was better than those to which I had been used to. He said that they were ready to discuss every question in a new meeting. We did not touch details there. He suggested to agree on a meeting in the nearest future and in general said that they wanted to somehow improve relations. We left the place with positive emotions. We immediately wrote him a letter with courageous proposals saying that we were ready to answer any questions he might have and that we were looking forward to his reply. The reply was sent to Mr. Grigol Vashadze, now attending. He telephoned me and told me that the reply was very frustrating. After this I met Medvedev in Astana on the occasion of the anniversary of Astana in Kazakhstan. When I asked him there what was the follow up of our meeting, as we had had a telephone conversation during which I could not receive a definite answer, he said that probably it was too early for the meeting until situation fundamentally changed between Georgia and Russia. On this I said that the meeting made sense anyway as the existing difficult situation could become more complicated without talks, but unfortunately he refused very clearly there. I had an impression that after the June meeting the center of decision making in Russia probably upbraid him for his proposal or some other intention. Anyway his rhetoric already in the month of July in Astana was much different than that of June, which was not ideal, but still something better.
By the way I mentioned this earlier. In Astana, during one of the informal meetings Nazarbaev turned towards me after my dialogue with Medvedev and told me " I have never seen you in such a bad mood. What’s wrong with you?” Probably I could not hide this. Usually I always try to be very open and communicative at such meetings. So, this is how things stood during those meetings. At the same time, as you know, there were lots of provocations carried out against us as well as legislative acts and specific military operations. Rhetoric concerning us and spread through information media as well as in the statements of high officials, was also very bad. This was mainly what concerned situation... In conclusion I would like to say (probably, you will have a question about this) that my last attempt to contact President Medvedev before the war was in the evening of the 6th or 5th, if I am not mistaken...on the 6th? Yes, on the 6th in the evening, when the situation became extremely difficult. First I called not anyone else, but President Medvedev, that is through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which usually provided the line with the Russian President. The reply was the following: "The situation is not ready yet for the Presidents to talk to each other. Let the Presidents speak later.” This was the answer. Then, as you know, I had been trying to speak to Medvedev or Putin every day on 8, 9 and 10. And by the way my initiative to telephone was carried on by the Russians through different diplomatic channels and it was like a game: I was calling and they were not answering. We saw such game for many times later. I was a witness how Sarkozi was not connected with different excuses with President Medvedev for a very long time, when he was visiting Tbilisi. Probably this is the part of their diplomatic game. This is something like a Byzantine-Mongol game probably maintained by the elements of bureaucracy. What are the other questions?
Chairman.
Mr. President, proceeding from this, I can not help asking you the following. Do you think that your personal aggressive approach towards Russia,...
M. Saakashvili.
Yes...
Chairman.
...so obvious in your rhetoric, made it impossible to regulate relations between Russia and Georgia?
M. Saakashvili.
Yes...
Chairman.
I would like to remind an example of this rhetoric. Why did you call then President of Russia Putin – Liliputin – and do you think this could cause the reasons for aggression?
M. Saakashvili.
Batono Paata, have you personally heard yourself me calling him what you said now? I do not want to repeat it now. Have you ever heard it anywhere?
Chairman.
I am asking this question as we have been advised by the people that you had referred this towards the Russian President and the aggression having followed this from Russia was a response...
M. Saakashvili.
People might spread any information, but I would like to stress that I have never done this under any circumstances - in a meeting with him tet-a-tet or during my public speech, with any other leaders or ordinary people, our citizens or citizens of foreign countries. I always pronouncedly respected him and have never assaulted him like this. I have never applied any rude expression towards any of the Russian leaders. This was my principle of action not only before the war, but, even after it. You could have observed this. Despite the fact, that I had every reason to be infuriated... You might know what expressions used in my address by Russian leaders Sarkozi and his Chancellery have spread; what epithets and threats were said; what terminology was used in our address. They have shot very "interesting” plots in a number of films about me, widely replicated by mass media. Despite this we have never used any coarse word in their address. Besides, I did so not because I liked them very much or vice versa. I always believed that those relations were not personal ones. They were relations between the states. We have always been liable, even doomed to build these relations whether we liked each other or not. Furthermore, I remember my first disposition when I arrived in Moscow. You mentioned the February meeting, but I remember my first February meeting of 2004. I felt an internal need to like Putin not as an individual as such, but as a partner President. I really felt this need. My instinct prompted me I had to develop as well-wishing relations as possible based on mutual confidence. I have achieved this with a number of world leaders. You know that I have friendly, even unceremonious relations with many European leaders, President Bush and our other neighbours, although even these relations have never passed the frames. Regrettably, in the case of Russia, our partners’ side has never wished this to be so. And, I think that, the reason for that has been the fact that they have never considered us to be their equal partners. They have never considered us as separate players either. The believe that we are a part of a wide conspiracy against them. It is a pity that we have not been able to establish with them relations of this kind. Despite this I would like to say that the myths about personal reasons of bad relations between us are spread by those people who do not to see fundamental problems in our relations. I would like to remind that the person whom the current authorities of Russia hated most of all is my predecessor President Shevardnadze. They had been using in his address all kinds of such epithets at both formal and informal meetings, which we would never imagine to think of or say. In Shevardnadze’s time they first bombed Georgia for several times; cut gas supply, first thing as soon as Putin came to power as Acting President. President Clinton, before he left, called Putin and asked him to resume gas supply to Georgia. This has been done to Georgia in the times of Eduard Shevardnadze. So, relations became tense much earlier and the reason for that was fundamental difference rather than incompatibility of characters.
Chairman.
Mr. President, when you were speaking about your meetings with Putin, Medvedev, you mentioned that you were in a bad mood as you realized that serious provocation was being prepared against Georgia. Did you have consultations with the administration of the United States – one of our main allies? Did you get any so called "green light” from the Administration of the United States regarding starting of your military operations? Where were red lines drawn for us – Georgia and for our partners (as we know, the main partner of ours is the United States)? Nowadays in Georgia some people have an impression that a certain group holds negotiations regarding "green lights”. What do you know about this? Could you please answer this question?
M. Saakashvili.
I do not know and I have no an idea where this terminology - "green light” and generally "lights” has come from. We have never asked anyone to give us any green lights and consequently have not seen it. No one has ever wished to see it. We are speaking about a concrete thing. We have been always convincing our friends that Russia is holding an extremely aggressive policy, which is out of the frames of ordinary, classical provocations.
When we are speaking about provocations we have to admit that provocation can be different, like making a statement or arresting someone... But when we are speaking about bombing of our country; when we are speaking about construction of military bases on our sovereign territory; when we are speaking about legalization of the regimes established after ethnic cleansing; when we are speaking about grabbing properties of hundreds of thousands of our citizens by the citizens of other countries; when we are speaking about distribution of passports – an example of concrete aggressive juridical act – all these are no more provocations. These are concrete actions of annexation. Our conversations went further. We always told our friends both in Europe and United States, that if they started, for example, mass terrorization in different places, if they again turned out tens of thousands of our citizens from their places of residence, if they organized mass explosions and attacks, of course, that would practically mean that we were in the stage of an active confrontation with our big neighbour and asked everyone to assist in such situation and speak to Russians. And I think that our partners realized this, although some of them – very late, but still... This is why Solana arrived from the European Commission; this is why Steinmeier arrived with very concrete packages of proposals; this is why Condoleezza Rice arrived. We were assuring all of them that situation was becoming more difficult and asking to prevent jointly what could happen.
As we see it now, unfortunately this interference was already too late and not intensive enough to avoid the conflict. Besides, inactivity or, in certain cases, disdain of some of our partners served as a wrong signal for the aggressive part of the authorities of the Russian Federation. And this was also one of the incentives for everything what happened later in Georgia.
The war in Georgia did not break out in August. The war, in its broader meaning had started much earlier – years and months earlier. In August Russia decided to transfer the war into its most active phase, which had to finish this issue once and forever. This was a fact, but everything taking place before did not become the subject of adequate reaction. I think that our diplomats have done impossible though as well as you, parliamentarians and all other people involved in this in order to avoid this all.
The aim was to prevent a wide scale confrontation. This was our short term objective. Our long term objective was a peaceful restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia with the support of the international community and either support or friendly neutrality of Russia. Unfortunately we could not realize this.
Chairman.
... One precision please...
D. Lortkipanidze
. Yes, precision
Chairman.
There is a question about this and afterwards Mr. Givi Targamadze will ask.
D. Lortkipanidze.
Mr. President, you have mentioned Ms. Condoleezza Rice’s arrival. Various interpretations of the information about this have been spread. I would like to ask you about this. You have mentioned certain provocations presumably carried out or intended to be carried out by Russians. You said that the response of the democratic authorities on this would be adequate. Did Ms Condoleezza Rice, despite of these provocations, personally advise Georgian authorities not to become involved in them?
M. Saakashvili.
We had been permanently warning the Americans that the provocations were intensified and the response of Americans on this was to be as preserved as possible and do not get involved in the provocations. But the fundamental principles of the Americans and our European partners were based on the strategic anticipations, which were changed only in August.
Russia, despite its threats, aggressiveness and irascibility; despite its all kinds of major or minor provocations was not yet ready for a wide scale intervention into other countries, because its actual last big intervention like the one, carried out in Georgia, was in 1979 in Afganistan (carried out by the Soviet Union). Before that their intervention took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and before that in Hungary in 1956. And the fundamental principles established in the 90-es is that despite the fact that Russia had been openly or secretly taking part in different conflicts and no one believed when I said that Russia was fundamentally ready to do the same what had been done by the Soviet Union in Brezhnev’s and Khrushchev’s times in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.
The main misunderstanding or rather discrepancy was that everything was clear, but we had to avoid getting involved into provocations as Russia would never do that. Unfortunately, this fundamental attitude existed and furthermore, some of us, in spite of the facts taking place around Georgia; in spite of the sure signs of a wide scale military operation, did not believe in our heart of hearts that they could cross this red line and be so prudent.
This is why Vano Merabishvili told you yesterday that may be we were even late with our response. I do acknowledge that we could be late with our response, but we did not believe until we checked 500 times, until we verified all our sources: Intelligence Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs, information from the field and just people we knew, let’s say, in Gori and other places - all confirming escalation of activities. It was difficult to believe this even for us until we faced the fact itself that something unbelievable was up to start. Even today, post factum, some people in the United States and Europe still can not believe – did they really start; did they really take the first step?
The world order having established in the world after the end of the Cold War in 1991 has changed profoundly due to the Russian aggression. This was not jus an intervention. Everything has been revised again. Even the Cold War doctrine was revised. Although we maintained saying that that the Cold War is impossible, it is a fact that what Russia did was a hot expression of the Cold War, so rarely done even during the cold war period. What we were repeating fundamentally, that the borders are indestructible, was changed for the first time after the WWII by a big European state having attempted to change the frontiers of the neighboring country with the use of force. After the Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union this has been an unprecedented case in Europe. And, of course, I would not blame my friends for not to believe this would happen.
Chairman.
Batono Givi.
M. Saakashvili.
Batoni Levan had a question, if I am not mistaken
L. Vepkhvadze.
No, no... I shall go on Batono Mikheil...
M. Saakashvili.
As far as I know opposition is anyway running the whole show in this Commission... I have never seen such a majority.
L. Vepkhvadze.
You have mentioned fundamental principles, which were referred to when our western partners did not believe expected or possible intervention. But we have also listened to the Minister of Defence, Minister of Internal Affairs and the Secretary of the National Security Council. The latter presented a whole range of arrangements carried out by Russians. And when I was listening to his report my very first impression was that the following logical step had to be an intervention. Despite this, all the officials having come here, including you, Mr. President, stated that they were all optimistic and did not believe that the Russians would take a risk to start an intervention of this extent. Is the fact, that your visit to Beijing was cancelled half an hour earlier before the flight, an exaggerated optimism on the background of the existing reality? On the 29th of July first our villages were already being bombed by 120mm shells. On 1, 2, 5 and 6 August this process was still going on whilst you took a decision at the last moment and not before. We have information that in the morning of the 7th of August a column of Russian armed forces started coming into the country. What information did the analytical group, working here and providing you with reports, base on advising that intervention could still not start?
M. Saakashvili.
Batono Levan, I share your...
Chairman.
Mr. President, I would also like to add a question regarding this block so that you could answer them together. When the Intelligence Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were providing you with information about the Russian preparations for intervention, why did not you stop the mandate of the Russian Peace Keepers, who became a reason of certain operations started and whose mandate was used against us.
M. Saakashvili.
Batono Levan, first of all, I partially share your criticism and would not deviate from self-criticism either. First, I would like to repeat what I have already said. Probably in the heart of heart none of us believed that Russia was capable of this. And please, do not blame me for this, because neither Chancellor Merkel (whom I told that such scenario could be expected) believed, nor the authorities of the United States, which has a very good intelligence service and could get information about all these movements and dislocations. Other leaders, whom I contacted on the 7th, also did not believe. Probably we were not careful enough, if I may say so, but as I have already told you, these provocations did not start on 6 and 7. This is a long story of several years. And as a rule it happened like this. They started escalation, opened fire at us. Unfortunately, always our citizens, policemen of all ethnicities were victims. We returned fire and as a rule situation for a while was usually back to normal. For example, there was an attack on Dimitri Sanakoev in July. We took responsive steps and increased security measures. There were no more armed provocations in the direction of Tskhinvali for quite a while. When the escalation started at the beginning of August we said that it also could be a provocation to which we had to be responsive increasing posts and our readiness. We thought that it would also calm down after a certain period. When the Russian rhetoric started I was on leave together with my family abroad and I had "a pleasure” to watch Russian channels in my room. I observed how Russia started an unusual fuss.
L. Vepkhvadze.
Sorry to interrupt,...
M. Saakashvili.
Yes...
L. Vepkhvadze.
Batono Mikheil, this was said at the Commission session with Kitsmarishvili about 21 July.
M. Saakashvili.
What is 21 July?
L. Vepkhvadze.
You were in Italy on 21 July. He said why you were in Italy for a week including 21 July.
M. Saakashvili.
I do not remember whether it was 21 August or not, but I was away for several days, to be more precise – for a week, but I returned in 4 or 5 days. I was on leave, by the way, for the first time during these five years, together with my wife, Sandra, Eduard and Nikoloz on leave. We ventured to take this opportunity after several quiet weeks. I would like to repeat again that after the incident with Sanakoev there were several weeks of emphatic peace and we thought we could go there for several days taking into account the fact that I was away from Tbilisi in three hour’s distance. We could go to the airport any time to be in Tbilisi in three hours. Our trip would take the same time if we went to Kutaisi by road. But when the escalation started again I returned. We responded, reinforced our action stations,. we were not going to Beijing to have fun. We had planned meetings with several world leaders. I tried to speak to President Medvedev on the telephone. This request was practically rejected, but we had a unique chance to see Putin, President Bush, Sarkozi, President of EU and France. They were all in Beijing. There we could arrange meetings and apart from such bilateral meetings there was a Reception scheduled on 8 August at 12 hours, which would be attended by every leader of the world. At such a reception even 5 minutes are enough to separate with someone and speak. This already can be quite important. This is why my initial plan was to fly in the morning in order to be there for the above reception. But exactly at that time, when we thought that situation was more or less calm, they opened fire at a number of our villages. Then I said that I would not go to the reception and that I would go to the Opening, where all the leaders would be also attending. But saw that situation was worsening. Although we were told in the morning that Russians would arrive to talk. They did arrive, but did not talk to us. Popov arrived and did not speak to us. We were getting bad news. I had to choose: either get on the plane and remain for several hours in the situation when one can not act. Although we have got a telephone and communication means, special communication means on board the plane, or stay in Georgia. But if I went there I would have done this in order to meet the world leaders there. It was already 20 minutes to 7. Our deadline to take off was 7pm. We received a telephone call from the Head of our Protocol Zurab Darchiashvili saying that I had to take a decision. If I was not immediately going to the airport there was a long queue of different delegations arriving in China and we would be out of turn and unable enter the country for 2 days. On this I said that I did not want to take a risk and was staying in Georgia. Georgia has often been in critical situation. We had a very serious and tense situation when Sanakoev was attacked. Situation was difficult in April and May, especially in May, when Putin ordered to bring in armed forces to Abkhazia. There were several armed attacks on Kodori. There was an attack in Tsitelubani. Provocations became routine for us as we had to live with them. We got so used to such life – and by the way this is also a method to let your opponent relax. This was a part of our life. In fact, our reactions at the beginning were more acute whilst at the end they already became a part of everyday life and because of this the state of Georgia could not stop its existence, as well as its diplomatic activities. Trip to Beijing would also be a very significant part of this diplomatic activity. Russians chose ideal time for the implementation of their plans. If we look at this attentively we shall see that there were several factors why Russia needed war in August. It was a political calendar. As you know after Bucharest they were waiting for a decision in December regarding NATO membership. The Chief of General Staff said clearly that they would resort various methods to prevent Georgia become a member of NATO. When the Chief of General Staff makes such statement, who is not a Director of Circus, what he means or what his methods are can be predictable. But what is the calendar for the Russian zone if you want to achieve anything before December? At the end of September it is already snowing in Caucasus. If you want to carry out military operations the best time for this is August or September. Why August? Because in August rivers are shallow and this is important to bring in tanks to Abkhazia. They constructed railway for this period. August is the best time for Russian aircrafts from the standpoint of weather. Their planes do not have good night vision. This is why they bombed with strategic bombers. The latter has got night vision. while SU 27, SU 25 and MIG 29 – do not. They do not have cloud vision either. They are blind in the clouds. In May, when escalation was very acute, even if they had any plans, they would be obliged to refuse from them, because it was raining all May. This is just a speculation. I do not know whether they had any serious plans then, but we were at the edge of a serious, very serious escalation. August with its weather was an ideal month for military operations. I want all of us to remember, that Russia not only in Georgia, but elsewhere had been planning and realizing its other provocations in August. Two wars in Chechnya started in August... both times in August. I would like to emphasize this. Provocations in Abkhazia also started in August both in 1992 and 2004. Escalation lasted for several months then. Real military operations in Tskhinvali started in August after Russian instructors came and brought in weapons. They were giving directions to press. This was one thing. The other thing was that at the beginning of August everyone in the world thinks of pleasant things like a leave, as you mentioned I had also been on leave with my family, but not only me, but all the world leaders also do the same – either are on leave or travel. For example, when I started looking for people, Chancellor Merkel was on leave out of the country somewhere; the Foreign Minister Steinmeier was on Sardinia and had his telephone turned off. When I tried to contact the Secretary General of NATO, he was not in Brussels either and I could not speak or see him. I could not speak openly, because open conversations are intercepted by everyone who wants to do so and we all know very well who does this more than others. I do not mean Merabishvili and the rest of leaders were all in Beijing. Bush and Sarkozi both were in Beijing. Can you imagine, that on the day of the opening of the Olympic Games, most of all I was astonished, when I listened to the statement of the Commander of the Russian Land Forces on the TV and this was the day when absolutely nothing was happening in Tskhinvali. This statement was one of the shocking symptoms. He said that Georgia was violating the Olympic Chart, as it was intending to start war on the day of opening of the Olympic Games. This was like a bolt from the blue for me. I have heard many provocative statements from Russians, but such an exact and clear indication, of course, was alarming. Just imagine...no one in the world cares for anything. Most of the people including leaders, are on leave. When people are on leave, very few of them watch TV or read newspapers. They are looking forward to watching opening of the Olympic Games. Somewhere very far in Georgia someone attacked someone at night. This is such an obscure issue for the world and such an ideal time for a big country to cover its shady business; such an unfavourable time for a small country to be heard fairly. August was the most dangerous and risky period fro us. I would like to repeat that we had a similar situation last year in August, when they bombed Tsitelubani as well as in 2004, when we were facing provocations in Tskhinvali. Only because August is a bad period for us, we could neither take out August from the calendar, not turn upside down all our way of life. But it should be admitted that dates were selected ideally and they worked. Before we contacted France and Sarkozi arrived from there, before Bush arrived only several days later, Putin left Beijing immediately, as, probably had been planned. He arrived after he saw everyone on the first day. Therefore, when I speak about selection of dates I mean that nothing was accidental. There are many things proving now that from the standpoint of military preparations this date was ideally chosen. You can look through any Russian newspaper. They said the same thing, that the construction of the military railway (yes, military, because Ochamchire and Gali are deserted places with very little population left. In fact this is a deadlock) would be over by 5 August. I would like to ask you – where did this date – 5 August – come from?
They were building a military base in Java. I know from international organizations, that each resident of Java was paid monthly 1200 Euros and this amount in Java equals to 5000 in Tbilisi and 50 000 – in Berlin, because it is a very poor place. They were paid because the locals had to finish their works by 5 August. Where did this hasty date come from? We did not allow them get building materials from our side exactly because they were constructing the base. They transported construction material from Russia which of course was much more expensive. The Black See Navy had already left the Ukraine.
As you know the President of Ukraine tried to stop them several times. He signed a special resolution, first about not letting them out of and afterwards about not letting them in, but Russians did not pay any attention to this. They left and returned without any remorse. Russians declared full mobilization in the North Caucasus, as well as of its paratroopers. They did not let people go on leave either in Russia, or across the border. I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that yes, we saw all these signals, but they repeated something similar nearly every summer. This time they did too much. It will take a time to analyze this. Any intelligence service (and Georgia is not a super power of such services) would have needed weeks to analyze everything in one mosaic.
I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that we had this information at the beginning of July. We observed that Georgians, Russian citizens of Georgian origin, were under control in the North Caucasus. All of them (and there were lots of them) were released from the armed forces. There was a decree prepared (and we had a copy of it) ordering to record and analyze every Georgian conversation in the North Caucasus. They increased control over the Abkhaz section of the Russian-Georgian border, which was quite unusual for the season of tourism. They started mass repressions towards suspicious elements, as they call them and who could have contacts with Georgia. This small detail of intelligence – arresting information in the Caucasus region about what would happen - was very much like a preparation for something serious.
And now we say that this was something unexpected for the world. The tourism season was unsuccessful not only in Abkhazia, where it totally failed, but in Sochi too, which is the main resort of Russia. Hotels in Sochi have usually been all full of tourists in previous years, while this year it was only 30%. Why? Because the whole of the Russian press was speaking about possible Georgian-Russian war. I have read myself the articles by Pavel Felengauer and had an opportunity to meet him. He earnestly repeated in April, if I am not mistaken, that the war would be either in May or August. He was very exited about this fact and when I asked him why was this good, he answered, that there was nothing better for a military journalist than observing a war, especially in summer. He said "We are not anyway doing anything in summer and we shall have a rest and observe war at the same time.” This was the situation surrounding us.
Parallel to this Steinmeier was active, Solana was active, I prepared very radical letters. I mean radical in the light of flexibility, diplomatic proposals and degree of boldness. I wrote them to Medvedev having imagined what Russia would want if it did not wish a war; what I could, for example, offer them regarding Abkhazia to convince them. What could stop them so that we both could get something. Even if we could not get 100%, but only 30% - would be also acceptable for the time being, but all in vain.
I think that they made up their minds to start military operations against Georgia in order to somehow cope with our country. This decision was probably taken some time in 2001 or 2002 before we came to power. In autumn of 2006 Russia was very close to the point, but they declined because of the following three factors: harsh reaction of the European Union and their common position; harsh reaction of the American Administration and insufficiency of Russians’ readiness first of all in the Northern Caucasus. Their final decision, I think, was taken some time in February or March before the Bucharest Summit and decision about Kosovo. Our meeting with Putin was only a formal dialogue. He did not wish to deal with us and I am afraid this had been their position earlier. Batoni Gia will confirm this. We left the 21 February meeting with heavy impressions and empty-handed.
Chairman.
Mr. President, I asked a question. You forgot to answer my question.
M. Saakashvili.
Mandate of Peace Keepers...Sorry... Why we did not stop their mandate...? Because people say now that Georgia might have caused provocations. If we had stopped their Peace Keepers’ mandate people would start saying both in America and Europe that this was a provocation; that good or bad the mandate was preventing from some other troubles, although everyone knew that there was nothing peaceful in them. If Georgia had done so without initial consultations then Georgia would be considered as an initiator of complication of the situation. We had discussions about this with our partners and we started very detailed preparations for that. This was Steinmeier’s plan about; this was the reason for Solana to arrive visit. Solana openly spoke about expediency of substitution by Europeans. We were proposing to substitute and not – turn out. I know that they will not go. And this will be followed by a total escalation. We had some progress in this direction and, I think, this accelerated Russia to start military operations. The reason was that Solana started open discussions as well as EU that it was possible to substitute Russians by the European monitors or any other forces.
There was something similar in Steinmeier’s plan, although he was leaving a certain part to Russians. This had always been an issue. There is nothing to be hidden in this. When I was a student in America, Shevardnadze signed a peace agreement. As a student I published several articles in Georgian and foreign press. I participated in the conference and criticized this. I studied this. International law and international peacekeeping was my specialty. I am a specialist of national minorities and human rights. I had been studying this and wrote scientific articles about. I worked and wrote term papers on international peacekeeping operations in America and Institute for Human Rights in Oslo. Therefore, what the Georgian authorities did then - was very painful for me. Although forced by hopelessness and blackmail they made presence of occupants legal. The first Peacekeeping battalion was the one having fought together with separatists when occupying Sukhumi. This was very difficult for me.
We were already trapped, because the Russians managed to match their so called "peace keeping” presence with UNOMIG’s presence in Abkhazia. And our main concern was not whether Russians had to stay or not, but what would their reaction be if we told these international observers to leave. Whenever we asked Russians to leave they always said that they would automatically withdraw the internationals. We had been thinking about this for many years. Why we did not have, for example, heavy military weapons in Nikozi, sorry, in Kurta, Tamarasheni, Kekhvi and other villages? Because, this was not envisaged by the peace keeping mandate; because Georgia had always been following the rules of its peace keeping mandate. Our decency brought us to this point. We were following the peace keeping mandate and that is why our Georgian police was armed with light weapons. When the situation became very difficult it was too late to bring in heavy weapons to Abkhazia, Besides, we respected UNOMIG and UN international mandate. We were very preserved and had been discussing for a long time; had consultations in accordance with the international principles. Did we have to follow Dagomis and Moscow agreements? Batono Paata, we were both in Zugdidi on 9 August, when our neighbour demonstrated to us and the whole of the international community that they don't give a damn about the international mandate. UN observers were there. We watched from a close distance how Russians moved with their tanks, military equipment, infinitely many soldiers. They said to the UN Observers "We are giving you 20 minutes to leave. We are going to Samegrelo from here”. It took our illustrious observers even less than 20 minutes to run away from the site. This was a clear lesson of how lawlessness triumphs over those people who want to follow laws; how win those people who never follow any law or agreement over those who are too decent not to respect their own agreement. Russia saw that the international process has startied; that things were moving from a dead point, which had been our dream for many years. You know that in June UN General Assembly 15 years later acknowledged ethnic cleansing held in Abkhazia. When the process of internationalization started the UN said: "Wait, wait, you will not get internationalization now. You will get what happened. We shall all discuss a new counting out point later”. We found ourselves in this situation. Did we have to act otherwise? I still believe that it was a right policy, strategy and tactics to respect the international agreement.
We are a small country. International law is the alpha and omega for the activities of a small country. I am a specialist of international law and, I know, that some of you too. And we know that the borders, sovereignty and future of a small country are protected not by a rough power. Here a small country will always loose. It is protected by international regimes, norms, rules, agreements and a good will of the international community and, of course, Russia could permit itself to become impudent, what they did.
D. Lortkipanidze.
Mr. President, my question will be about the international community. You have mentioned that on the 7th of August President Bush was in Beijing and met Mr. Putin. During these 7 days I gave this question to several ministers. Unfortunately I could not receive any answer and therefore decided to ask you the same question: what consultations (with whom) took place, both inside and outside the country on the 7th of August, before making this decision? And the second question: I do not know whether these are just rumors or true, but the information was spread as if on the 8th of August Mr. Mathew Braiza arrived in Tbilisi and as if you refused to receive him during 2 days because of President Bush’s statement which, according to experts’ opinion was not quite adequate to the situation in Tskhinvali area on the 8th of August.
M. Saakashvili:
I would like to tell you that first of all we make decisions on such matters independently, without asking any prior permissions – if you mean a permission we do not take any. This is one point, the second point is that at the peak of the escalation the person I tried to contact was the President of the Russian Federation Dimitri Medvedev and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave us a negative answer regarding such contact.
The second person we tried to contact was Mr. Popov, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and tried to solve the situation in the area. Maximum we could achieve was contact with General Kulakhmetov, because as you know Mr. Popov also refused to communicate with us using various excuses, even though he arrived in Tbilisi but avoided going to Tskhinvali and regulating the situation.
On the 7th of August the situation became very complicated. Our peace keepers were killed, fire was started and ceased several times and the intensity was growing from time to time. Therefore, the 7th of August, in the evening, I decided to contact all possible friends and supporters from my telephone book. I called our friends: the President of Lithuania Mr. Adamkus, the President of Poland Mr. L. Kachinski, found the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden Mr. Bildt and Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. We informed Presidents Adamkus and Kachinski about the situation and they promised to call others too. I told them that we could not get in touch with Russians. I gave him as much information to the Secretary General of NATO as the non-secure line permitted. I repeat once more that I could not give all details because the intelligence service of the neighboring country was checking all information sources, the situation was already very serious and details of the operations could not be risked. I gave him a general overview of the situation and said it was very grave. By the way everybody was surprised that the situation was aggravated in Tskhinvali area. It seems that everyone, like ourselves, expected problems with regards to Abkhazia. Why? Because the Russians hah been constantly mentioning the Kodori gorge. Kodori was stuck like a lump in their throat and Medvedev, Lavrov and other Russian officials actually made 2-3 statements a day regarding Kodori. Usually they seemed not to remember Tskhinvali. Well, the situation was like I said – I contacted everyone I could. As for Americans, I know that Eka Tkeshelashvili talked to different representatives of the State Department in order to inform them about the situation. At this moment I do not remember when I met Mathew Braiza, I definitely met him during those days.
At that time we had… first of all we went towards Tskhinvali several times; I visited Gori several times, we had constant meetings. We visited Zugdidi on the 9th. It was already impossible to use a plain so we spent the whole day driving up and down the roads. This was an absolute priority and I did not have any TV interviews on that day. But of course I am not the only person in the Government and visiting officials of all levels met other representatives of our Government and talked to them. Definitely I was not angry with anyone, I understood that our partners needed time to look into the situation and evaluate its complexity, time was very valuable. But Russians made them grasp the situation quickly, because when I first talked to Condoleezza Rice on the phone… more exactly when the US Ambassador came to me for the first time and told me about the conversation between Condoleezza Rice and Pavlov… Russians were in a very aggressive mood and when we asked them about the goal of their intervention they said it was complete destruction of Georgia – the answer was conveyed to us through Americans. It was on the 8th of August that complete destruction of Georgia was mentioned… I hope all partners will verify that the Russians were sending such messages. You know that President Sarkozi has mentioned other more vivid details about the plans the Russian leaders had regarding me personally. I will not go into the physiological details here but these were the terms used by them to express their opinion and they really did not restrain themselves while communicating menaces or the ways of their implementation.
Maybe it was possible to react correctly earlier, to react quickly but anyway in a few days, very serious actions of our partners substantially hindered Russia’s maneuvers, implementation of the last stage of the Russian aggression against Georgia.
Chairman:
Mr. President! One of the main accusations made with regards to Georgia and personally your decision is that you attacked the sleeping city, we are talking about Tskhinvali. What would you say about the attack: was it done at night and if yes, why? Was it a correct decision? What were the conditions there? There are some bypass roads there. Concretely what orders did you give at the beginning of these events? We are asking about your orders. The Head of the Head of the General Staff has already given us information on this issue. We would like to hear from you what particular orders you gave and why it was decided to carry out this attack at night. I think Mr. G. Gabashvili wants to add something.
G. Gabashvili:
Since we are already talking about the 7th of August, I thing the following question would be important: Based on what data and at what time did you decide that this was not one more traditional provocation that used to take place in Georgia from time to time, but that it was a large scale intervention? At what moment did you give such evaluation to the events and made the decision that Georgia had to get involved in the military actions?
Chairman.
Mrs. K. Gogorishvili wants to ask a question and then Mr. Minashvili
K. Gogorishvili:
Mister President, I have one question on this issue. Why wasn’t the population evacuated from the villages of Tskhinvali region before the final decision about starting a military operation? Thank you.
Chairman...
A. Minashvili...
A. Minashvili:
Good Afternoon Mister President! There is a lot of talk on this topic in Russia and in the whole world: Did Georgia’s military forces attack the Russian "Peace Keepers” as they were called at that time?
Chairman.
Mr. G. Targamadze
G. Targamadze.
I would like to ask you to what extent you were aware of the statement made by the Head of the Georgian Peace Keeping forces Mr. Kurashvili? This is the first question, and the second one: to what extent it was justified for the Georgian government to undertake several billions of expenses and take actions to form the Georgian army? I would like to ask you what do you think would have happened if we have not had such an army and have not made the decision to carry out military operations?
M. Saakashvili.
Thank you. I wrote down your questions but please remind me if I miss something.
As I have already told you, Russia has been preparing for this for a long time. I would like to say that we are dealing with a propagandistic machine of an authoritarian country. Starting from the soviet period this machine has accumulated a huge experience of disseminating disinformation. It is definitely not easy to fight against it. Recently I visited Ukraine for the memorial day of Ukrainian Famine – real genocide...
Редактирано от Dako
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Михаил Саакашвили [re: Sargon lll]
